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Do plants represent according to Kant? This is closely connected to the question of 
whether he held plants are alive, because he explains life in terms of the faculty to 
act on one’s own representations. He also explains life as having an immaterial 
principle of self-motion, and as a body’s interaction with a supersensible soul. I 
argue that because of the way plants move themselves, Kant is committed to their 
being alive, to their having a supersensible ground of their self-activity, and to 
their having desires (although these are not conscious). This has important 
ramifications for Kant’s teleology and philosophy of mind. 
In the Critique of Teleology, it is striking how little Kant discusses life or the 
souls of organisms. Although Kant rejects a strict analogy between the self-active 
formative power of organisms and life, I show this often ignored analogy is still 
central for understanding this power, even though it cannot belong to a natural 
science like that of teleology. Further, I argue that it is unsurprising that when he 
turns to a possible supersensible ground of teleological order in sensible nature, 
his focus is not on the souls of living beings but on God as their potential creator, 
because only God could be the free cause responsible for this apparent order.  
Kant holds we can only understand other minds through an analogy with 
our own. In the case of non-rational animals, he claims we should abstract from 
our self-consciousness and freedom, and attribute an analogue of reason to them. 
With plants we should further abstract from the powers of reproductive 
imagination, apprehension, and empirical consciousness, and only impute a 
representing subject with a very simple faculty of desire. Nonetheless, we can draw 
these analogies in virtue of the genus “living being” that is shared by all three kinds 
of self-active being (KU, 5:464n), even if the three species of representing subject 
may be transformed through their differentia.  
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KANT ON PLANTS: SELF-ACTIVITY, REPRESENTATIONS, 
AND THE ANALOGY WITH LIFE 
 
§1 – Introduction 
Do plants represent? For Kant this question is closely connected to the 
question of whether plants are alive because one way that Kant explains life is in 
terms of the faculty to act in accordance with one’s representations (specifically 
desires) (e.g., MM, 6:211). He also, however, explains life through self-motion (e.g., 
MAN, 4:544). And he often speaks of life as the interaction of a material body with 
an immaterial soul, where this soul is not merely a psychological being, but is also 
a supersensible ground of activity (e.g., Met-M, 29:904). 1 
 
1 In the tradition one finds an array of positions on whether plants are alive or have a soul. 
Arguably, the most common position attributes a soul as an inner principle of motion to them but 
denies them representations. (For a comprehensive history, see Ingensiep (2001).)  
Briefly, and with an eye to the main influences on Kant, the Stoics—physicalists—held 
plants had pneuma and in particular phusis (φύσις) or organic nature, but not psuchê (ψυχή) or a 
soul as a cognitive power. (E.g., Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.120-1; for discussion, see Annas, p. 54; 
thank you to Melissa Merritt for pointing me to these passages in Cicero and to Annas).  
Later, Suárez denied plants sense and appetite, but still held that they are alive (De An. 
IC4n08, Opera 3:494-5), while Arriaga holds that life only applies to both plants and God 
equivocally. Even if late scholastic philosophers, following Aristotle (De Anima, II.12), attributed a 
soul as a non-mechanical life-principle to plants, they held that the “vegetative soul is material” 
(Des Chene, 2006, p. 219; see Des Chene, 2000 for more on the notion of life in late scholastic 
philosophy, esp. Ch. 3 on life in plants).  
In the wake of Descartes’s notorious position that animals lacked souls, in the 
controversies over the mechanistic explanation of living things, significantly more attention was 
paid to animals than to vegetative powers. Closer to Kant’s time, influenced by Newton, researchers 
like Hales (1727) had argued for a mechanical conception of plant physiology, and Reimarus (1754, 
1760) had argued plants were dead machines. Locke (1690, Bk. II, ch. 27, §8), Duhamel (1758), and 
Bonnet (1766, 1770-1), however, take trees to be paradigmatic cases of organic or living beings (see 
Cheung, 2009). In these discussions the focus is on the physiological powers of reproduction, 
growth (or assimilation), and self-maintenance. And although researchers will appeal to plant life 
or plant souls (e.g., Duhamel, 1758, Vol. 2, p.165), this does not seem to mean more than the 
“material” vegetative soul of the late scholastics.  
Even in the later epigenetic theories of Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734-1794) and Johann 
Blumenbach (1752-1840)—which were more vitalistic than the earlier mechanical epigenetic 
theories of Maupertuis (1698-1758), de Buffon (1707-1788), and Needham (1713-1781)—the vis 
essentialis of Wolff (1759) or the Bildungstrieb of Blumenbach (1780) seem to be merely material. In 
his 1787 Institutiones physiologicae, for example, Blumenbach distinguishes between different vital 
forces (Lebenskräfte), separating (i) the formative drive (Bildungstrieb) from the properties of the 
(ii) motion of the parts of organisms, and (iii) sensation, the latter two of which he only attributes 
to animals. Thus, if sensation is the beginning of the psychological, then the formative drive is 
material. 
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Thus, because of Kant’s explanations of life, the original question opens up 
onto how he holds self-movement relates to having a supersensible soul or to 
having a psychological subject. In this essay I argue that he is committed to 
reflectively judging any organism that moves-itself is alive, has a supersensible 
principle of life, and has a representing, desiring subject. This is because self-
movement exhibits spontaneity, not in the full and proper sense of a free, original 
cause, but in the restricted sense of engaging in self-directed activity. The 
organism is neither a mere patient, nor a mere agent, but is simultaneously its own 
patient and agent because it acts on itself.  
I develop this interpretation by examining Kant’s remarks on life and 
organisms. We will see that Kant holds matter as matter is inert; it is only moved 
by external causes. In organisms, however, we encounter self-movement that 
seems to stem from an inner formative power to maintain itself, grow, and 
reproduce. This material causal power exhibits a reciprocal causal interaction 
between its parts and is characteristic of Kant’s ‘natural ends.’ Interpreters often 
investigate Kant’s analogy between organisms and artifacts in order to understand 
 
Now it is generally accepted that Kant holds the powers distinctive of organisms and living 
beings cannot be cognized in the way that the powers of merely dead matter can. Rather, we can 
only treat these beings as though they had these powers. Kant makes this point by claiming that the 
attribution of these powers should only be through reflecting, and not determining, judgment. Still, 
we will see below that this reflective attribution is stronger than, say, the way that Descartes can 
claim it is as though animals had souls.  
I argue that within the powers that Kant holds we should reflectively attribute to 
organisms and living beings, Kant divides between the material and the immaterial ones, and that 
this holds for plants as well. In my “Kant on Vital Forces and the Analogy with Life” (whose §2-4 
overlap significantly with §3 of this essay), I focus on Kant’s conception of the formative power of 
organisms. This power belongs to an organism, a material being. So I argue that if we could judge 
determinately that there was such a power, then we would take it to be material.  
In this essay, however, I look beyond the material, natural world, to the power of life. We 
will see that if we could judge determinately that there was such a power, then we would take it to 
be immaterial, and that Kant also holds that we should reflectively attribute a corresponding 
supernatural, immaterial power to any living being. As a result, we will see that if plants are living 
beings, then Kant is committed to reflectively attributing representations to them. And so if plants 
are alive, then Kant would be breaking with most natural philosophers, ancient and modern. 
(For recent discussions of Kant and Wolff, see Goy (2014); of Kant and Blumenbach, see 
van der Burg (2009); for earlier discussions of Wolff, see Dupont (2007) and Huneman (2007); and 
of Blumenbach and Kant, see Look (2006), Larson (1979), Lenoir (1980, 1981, 1982), and Richards 
(2000, 2002). Finally, after this essay had been accepted for publication Colin McLear brought 
Leland (2020) to my attention, which contains an extensive discussion of Baumgarten, Meier, 
Reimarus, and Kant on exactly these issues, and stresses a Leibnizian tradition on which all things 
are composed of representing, living monads, although only animals are conscious.) 
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this causal power, but they neglect his comparison of the formative material power 
of organisms with life. Reflecting on this comparison, however, we will be able to 
see his account of organisms as natural ends in a new way. Specifically, we will see 
that their reciprocal causal structure is made more comprehensible through 
comparison with the way the soul and body work on each other through the 
instruments of the nerves.2 
The picture that will emerge is one on which in living beings, a material 
body—an organism—is in communion with a supersensible soul that grounds a 
psychological subject. If we observe self-movement, then we can reflectively 
attribute to this being both a soul as its life principle, and a psychological subject 
with a faculty of desire. Kant holds that we make these attributions through an 
analogy with our own case. We are conscious that our own self-movement has a 
supersensible soul as its cause, through the thinking and desiring subject that it 
grounds. Because we are rational, and conscious of standing under the moral law, 
our supersensible soul is a free cause. This will not be true of non-rational living 
beings. Still, because they share with us the genus life, we will see that Kant holds 
we can reflectively judge that they have a soul and a desiring subject.  
This will hold not only of non-rational animals like beavers and horses, but 
also of plants. They too, after all, are organisms, have a formative power, and move 
themselves. For these reasons, Kant will be committed to them not only being 
alive and having a supersensible ground of this self-activity, but also to their 
having a simple psychological subject. We will find no evidence that he thought 
the plant subject was conscious in any way. In this respect it will differ in kind 
from the subjects of non-rational animals, which have empirical consciousness. So 
 
2 For the argument I make it is critical that Kant divides the concepts of <organism> or <natural 
end> from <life>. It is quite uncommon, however, for interpreters to distinguish these. For example, 
Guyer (2005), Watkins (2009), and Breitenbach (2014) all don’t, and the list could go on. Not 
distinguishing these concepts, however, blocks interpreters from taking seriously the climactic 
analogy with life passage of §65. Three interpreters who distinguish these concepts and take this 
passage seriously are Ingensiep (2001; 2004; 2009), Zammito (2006), and Newton (2017). We will 
return to them in the next note. Leland (§2, 2020) argues that whether Kant distinguishes the 
concepts of <organism> and <life> is underdetermined by the textual evidence. His arguments, 
however, hinge on dismissing the analogy with life passage as unclear, but as I hope will become 
evident, we can make good sense of this passage.  
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all that will be left to the plant subject is simple subjective sensations of 
agreeableness and disagreeableness, along with correspondingly simple desires to 
pursue or avoid these, but with no consciousness at all of these inner states.3  
I begin by distinguishing three dimensions of life: (1) having an inner 
principle of self-motion, (2) having a faculty of representations (specifically desire), 
and (3) having a soul as a supersensible ground of activity (§2). I use these to 
develop an interpretation of Kant’s analogy between the formative power in 
organisms and life (§3), before turning to the textual evidence related to plant 
souls on these three dimensions (§4, 5, & 6). I then  (§7) turn to two arguments 
against ascribing desires and life to plants—(i) their subjects do not seem to have 
the unity requisite for producing such representations and (ii) it does not seem 
plants are conscious, something required for pleasure, and thus sensible desire—
before arguing that the best way to reconcile the tensions over plant life is to take 
Kant to attribute simple desires but no consciousness to them (§8 & 9). Finally, I 
turn to why Kant does not focus on souls, but on God, in the Critique of Teleology, 
 
3 I take the claim that Kant held plants have a psychological subject that represents to be the most 
controversial dimension of the interpretation I will be developing, and that most readers will find it 
prima facie implausible. This is born out in the interpreters who do distinguish the concepts of 
<organism> and <life>. Ingensiep, Zammito, and Newton all claim that we do not find Kant 
ascribing desire (or representations) to plants. (Although they overlook at least one ascription of a 
faculty of desire to them (Log-D, 24:772)). And because “life is the faculty of a being to act in 
accordance with laws of the faculty of desire” (KpV, 5:9n), they all conclude that although plants are 
paradigmatic organisms for Kant, he takes them not to be alive (Ingensiep (2004, §II.6; 2009, p. 
103), Zammito (2006, p. 763), Newton, (2017, p. 520)).  
There is, however, a lot more than we find in the discussions of these interpreters that 
speaks in favor of attributing a psychological subject that has desires to plants. In the text of the 
essay, in line with this, I will be arguing that because Kant holds that plants move themselves 
through their formative power, and self-movement is indicative of life, it is more plausible than not 
that Kant held plants were alive and represent. (For further support, which focuses more on Kant’s 
pre-critical work, see Leland (2020).) There is also, however, a good deal to be said for the opposite 
position, and there is room for disagreement both given Kant’s writings and philosophically. 
Indeed, I have often gone back and forth over which I find more compelling in writing the essay, 
and I think there is a deep and interesting tension in Kant’s view around this point.  
My main aims in the essay, then, are threefold. First, I aim to bring out the way self-
motion, life, a supersensible soul, a psychological subject, and self-activity—what is sometimes 
called relative spontaneity—are inter-connected for Kant. Second, I aim to illuminate what Kant 
would take to be the minimal powers that must be had by any being with a psychological subject. 
And third, I aim to make the most compelling case that I can, both philosophically and textually, 
that plants are alive and represent. The places one could push back on this last should be relatively 
evident to the reader, and I will even indicate some of these in the notes. Finally, in the conclusion 
I will say a bit about why I take Kant to be pulled strongly both towards accepting and rejecting 
plant life and representations.  
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even if expositing the self-organizing power of organisms requires judging 
reflectively that they interact with a soul (§10). 4 
  
§2 – Three dimensions of life 
What is life for Kant? Life, in the context of an embodied being, indicates 
the connection between a material and an immaterial substance (A393). This 
position from the first Critique is supported by the explanations consistently given 
across the metaphysics lectures. 5  In these, Kant will distinguish life, as the 
interaction (commercio) of a material body with a soul, from the principle of life, 
which is this soul. To take one characteristic example, in the 1782/83 Mrongovius 
transcripts he calls the connection of the soul and the body, their “interaction 
<commercium>” and says this “constitutes life” (Met-M, 29:904; 29:908).6 He then 
claims that, “thus the principle of life with human beings is not the body, but 
rather the soul” (29:914). We will return to the closely related discussion of these 
bodies, but for now, what are the ways in which the soul is a principle of life? 
Kant’s focus is usually on our case. He contrasts his view with the “common 
concepts of our reason” which asks how the subject stands in community with a 
body regarded as something “truly subsisting independently” of the subject (A389). 
By arguing that bodies do not so subsist, but are merely appearances, Kant argues 
that our cognition of bodies, including our own, is as immediate as our cognition 
of our inner states of mind. Thus, when Kant says the soul is immaterial, one 
contrast he has in mind is between the inner psychological subject that appears 
 
4  As a referee for this journal notes, Kant reserves ‘explain’ (Erklären) and ‘explanation’ 
(Erklärung/Explication) for what is derived “from a principle,” which he holds is not possible with 
final causes, but only with mechanical ones (KU, 5:412). We can however offer an ‘exposition’ 
(Erörterung/Exposition) or a ‘natural description’ (Naturbeschreibung) of products of nature or 
natural ends, which exhibit the structure of final causes, through the reflecting power of judgment. 
Thus, I will use the latter and not the former terms to designate Kant’s descriptions of natural 
products or ends and their distinctive powers (KU, 5:412, 5:417). 
5 See: Met-L1, 28:282-287; Met-K2, 28:753-755, 736, Met-D, 28:671; Met-M, 28:904-914; Met-V, 28:441. 
6 Contrast, however, the mid 1770s L1 notes, where Kant distinguishes “animal and spiritual life” in 
human beings (28:286). In the 1782/3 Mrongovious Lectures he seems to reject this second non-
bodily life: “Thus were the soul separated from the body, its life power may indeed not stop, but its 
life would” (29:914). We will see, however, that in Metaphysical Foundations, some senses of life 
seem not to require embodiment.   
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through inner sense and bodies as the physical, material appearances of outer 
sense. 
Unlike the concepts of common reason, Kant attributes the “absolute and 
inner cause of external and corporeal appearances” (A394), as well as that of inner, 
non-corporeal appearances, to an unknown intelligible something (e.g., 
A538/B566). This something is supersensible. In the Second Paralogism, Kant 
hypothesizes that for human beings it is the same bare supersensible Something 
that “is called a body in one relation,” that “would at the same time be a thinking 
being in another” (A359).7 This suggests that Kant also has another contrast in 
mind when he says the soul is immaterial. On this, there are the sensible objects of 
both outer and inner sense, which present us with the matter of (inner or outer) 
nature, and there is the soul as a supersensible ground of activity, which is neither 
an object of outer or inner sense.  This concept of the soul is empty (A400), it 
represents the soul as a bare “subject in itself without in turn being the predicate 
of another subject” (A401), and so the soul is an immaterial something of which we 
have no material, synthetic cognition.  
In these two contrasts we have three elements: the corporeal, the 
psychological, and the supersensible. Corresponding to these there are three 
dimensions to the soul as the principle of life: (1) it is the ground of self-motion in 
a body, (2) it is the ground of representations in the subject, (3) it is the intelligible 
supersensible ground of activity. Kant develops each of these further, as they relate 
to living beings generally, in his works on physics, anthropology, and practical 
philosophy. 
Turning to the first dimension, one of the most significant passages for 
understanding Kant’s views on life is in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science. There he claims that “matter, as such, is lifeless” (4:544). The Second Law 
of Mechanics, the law of inertia, states, “every change in matter has an external 
cause” (4:543), and “the inertia of matter is, and means, nothing else than its 
 
7 Kant puts forward this hypothesis many places (e.g., Met-M, 29:904-905, Met-V, 29:1032). For a 
classic discussion of many of the relevant issues and texts, see Ameriks (1990, especially ch. 2 & 3). 
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lifelessness, as matter in itself” (4:544). Furthermore, Kant will even claim that “the 
possibility of a proper natural science rests entirely and completely on the law of 
inertia” (4:544), which makes it critical to first become acquainted with the laws of 
matter as such, purged “from the admixture of all other active causes [wirkenden 
Ursachen]” (4:544).  
Kant’s claim is hard to understand. Chemistry studies phenomena like 
acidification or combustion that result from “the inner powers [Kräfte] of matter” 
(OP, (21:453); see also MAN, (4:530); Phys-D, (29:161)). These phenomena can seem 
to be changes in matter that do not have an external cause. To explain them 
chemistry postulates concepts like the ideas of pure salt or pure phlogiston 
(A646/B674). These are mixed in to things like earths, wood, or tin and it is their 
separation that causes acidification or combustion. Because these elements are in 
the earth or the tin, they seem to be responsible for the inner causal powers of 
those things to acidify or combust. Yet these things are dead matter. So, if some 
changes in lifeless matter have such internal causes, then what is specific to the 
inner causes of change indicative of life?8  
We can find some help with this question in the Foundations passage: 
Life is the faculty of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal 
principle, of a finite substance to change, and of a material substance [to 
determine itself] to motion or rest, as change of its state.
9
  
Properly speaking, in this passage Kant presents three conceptions of life. The first, 
in terms of self-activity, will apply to finite and infinite beings. The second, as a 
self-active change, is restricted to finite beings. And the third, as self-active change 
in motion, is restricted to material finite things.10 Here the third will be our focus.  
 
8 Kant comments on this question: “The inner formative forces (vires interne formatrices) can be 
either merely mechanical or organic formative. The latter are those which reciprocally combine the 
parts of bodies under one another as ends and means and as such make (ausmachen) organic bodies 
(for self-organizing matter is a non-entity)” (OP, 21:188-189). 
9 (MAN, 4:544). Compare also, for example, Met-L2, 28:594; Met-L1, 28:275; DSS, 2:329, as well as 
many of the passages discussed below on the souls of non-rational animate beings. 
10
 The question of how ‘life’ could apply non-equivocally to plants and God was a vexed topic 
among the scholastics. (For example, see Thomas’s treatment (ST, 1Q18a3).) I know of no place 
where Kant comments on this directly, but the quote is quite suggestive. 
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Substances have powers to both act on, and be acted upon by, other things. 
Active powers are powers to change the state of a substance. Passive powers are 
powers of a substance to have its states changed by a substance. We find both 
active and passive powers in inanimate beings: the sun (agent) shines on the stone 
(patient) and warms it. In the combustion of tin, the phlogiston reacts with the 
heat, and is released into the air. It is the phlogiston that explains the power of the 
tin to burn. But neither the tin itself, nor the phlogiston in it, begins the 
combustion. That requires an external condition: heat. Of course, the inner powers 
of organisms, too, will require the presence of external conditions. But what we 
will see is that they act and strive in a sense that the tin does not. The tree strives 
to maintain an order among its parts, while the phlogiston in the tin simply reacts. 
In this we will see that the tree is neither merely acted upon, nor merely acts on 
others, but acts on itself. That is, unlike the sun, we will see it is both agent and 
patient in its own self-activity. We will need to spell this out. But such self-activity 
will characterize the power of a living being to determine itself, with respect to 
motion and rest.11  
Because the explanation of life here is in terms of motion and rest it is 
proper to the science of extended nature—physical, movable objects—and it seems 
to allow that material beings can be alive. But as the rest of the Foundations 
passage attests, this is not straightforwardly so. In the next sentence Kant turns to 
the issue of what exactly this internal principle of self-activity might be: 
Now we know no other internal principle in a substance for changing its state 
except desiring, and no other internal activity at all except thinking, together with 
that which depends on it, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and desire or 
willing.  
Here Kant is drawing on a further explanation of life. Recall that at the outset we 
saw Kant explaining life as: “the faculty of a being to act in accordance with its 
representations,” where “the faculty of desire [Begehrungsvermögen] is the faculty 
to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the objects of these 
representations” (MM, 6:211). Similarly, in the Critique of Practical Reason, while 
 
11 Of course, this self-activity should not be confused with the self-activity of thinking (A68/B93). 
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delineating the notions that are to be borrowed from psychology, Kant says: “Life 
is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire” 
(KpV, 5:9n; Met-M, 29:894; ÜGTP, 8:181). And finally, in his notes on anthropology: 
“Life is nothing but the faculty of desire in its lowest exercise” (R1034, 15:465). 
Thus, for embodied beings to be alive is to have a faculty of representation, 
specifically desire, through which it can be the cause of the objects of its 
representations in the material world.12 
In the remainder of the paragraph, Kant then argues that we should not 
allow the explanation of life in terms of self-motion to lure us into thinking that 
matter as matter can be alive. Desiring, thinking, or feeling are internal actions. 
They are not something that we can represent through the outer senses and we 
cannot directly see or touch them. According to Kant, however, matter is what is 
in principle perceivable by such senses, where this will include things like 
magnetic matter, which is in space, although not perceivable by us (A226/B273, 
also KU, 5:467). Acts of mind, however, are not in space. So matter as matter—
what is in space—cannot be endowed with the powers to act in these ways. It 
would be tantamount to matter being both in and not in space. The contradictory 
position that endows matter with these powers, Kant calls hylozoism (MAN, 
4:544). And because it is contradictory, he claims “if we seek the cause of any 
change of matter in life, we will have to seek it forthwith in another substance, 
different from matter, yet combined with it.”13  
In this Foundations passage two dimensions of souls are present: they 
animate and they represent. These dimensions are also present when Kant 
attributes souls to non-rational animate beings at the ends of his metaphysics 
lectures.14 For example, he says: 
 
12 Although less clear than with the first class of explanations, there also may be multiple levels of 
determination to this class. Both finite and infinite beings act in accordance with representations. 
For finite beings, there is also a gap between choosing and enacting. And a being whose faculty of 
choice is pathologically affected will sense and be embodied. 
13
 (4:544; also e.g., DSS, 2:327n) Kant makes this argument often, although usually it is compressed. 
14 (Met-Her, 28:115-117; Met-L1, 28:274-278; Met-M, 29:878, 29:906; Met-V, 28:448-449; Met-L2, 
28:594; Met-D, 28:679-680, 28:689-690). For a classic discussion of these passages in relation to the 
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All matter is lifeless, this is the principle of physics, without this there is no natural 
science at all. But now what can produce alterations in itself is called living. Living 
beings <lebende Wesen> are called animals <animalia>. The principle <principium> 
of life must not be represented as material. Each principle <principium> of life 
must have a power of representation <vim repraesentativam>. Life means having a 
faculty for practicing actions in conformity with one's representations (Met-L2, 
28:594, see also Met-D, 28:679).  
 
Relevantly for our topic, in this passage Kant seems to simply identify being alive 
with being an animal, and in another he makes a similar identification because an 
animal “has a faculty to alter its own state as a consequence of its own 
representations” (Met-V, 28:449). 15 So, passages like these might seem to give us 
reason to think Kant excludes plants from the living. 
Still, there is a fairly straightforward reason to hesitate before drawing this 
conclusion. After all, perhaps plants are animals, at least in the relevant sense, 
because they are alive.16 Kant often used Latin for the key terms in these and 
related passages, and he seems to be explaining life in terms of having a soul 
(anima), or being an animal (animal). For example, at the outset of the 
Paralogisms he says that through the interaction (commercium) of the thinking 
substance with bodies we represent “the thinking substance as the principle of life 
in matter, i.e., as a soul <Seele; anima> and as a ground of animality (Animalität)” 
(A345/B403). Of course, non-rational animate beings don’t strictly think, although 
they have a soul (Seele; anima), and we saw him claim that “living beings are called 
animalia” (Met-L2, 28:594). Following Baumgarten (Metaphysica, §792-795), Kant 
will refer to the souls of non-rational animals as anima bruti (Met-D, 28:690; Met-
L1, 28:274; R4728, 17:689; R5481, 18:195). And in general he seems to use the term 
‘anima’ for a soul or principle of life in a being, as in the Dohna lectures of 1792-93: 
“Soul <anima>, one could call soul <Seele>, the subject of sensation [Empfindung], 
mind <animus, Gemut>, the subject of thoughts, and spirit <spiritus, Geist> - as the 
 
minds of non-rational animals see Naragon (1990), for a more recent discussion see McLear (2014), 
and now also the essays in Allais and Callanan (2020). 
15 To these one should add KU §82, were Kant seems to say that carnivores “can only be nourished 
by what lives” (5:426). Leland (2020, p. 2-3) gives a nice argument for why this is not decisive. 
16
 This would echo Plato, Timaeus, 77a-b, which is brought out nicely by Galen, In Platonis 
Timaeum commentarii fragmenta (e cod. Paris. gr. 2838), fr. 2 (on Timaeus 76e7-77c5). (Thanks to 
Kosta Gligorijevic for pointing me to these passages and Tom Marré for suggesting this reading.) 
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subject of spontaneity.”17 In these passages, then, to be an animal looks like it is 
just to have an anima. 
Throughout these passages with “anima” or “Seele” Kant seems to have in 
mind more than just the soul (1) as that which animates the animal.  After all, a 
“Seele” is a “subject of sensation”18 and he attributes to non-rational animals a 
“subject of representations” (Met-D, 28:690), or, more commonly, an “analogue of 
reason” where this is the complex of all of the lower cognitive powers.19  These 
passages suggest, then, that the soul, as a life force or vital power, is (2) also a 
representing subject—a topic of study for empirical psychology (e.g., KU, 5:461; 
PM, 20:308). 
In calling the soul of a non-rational animal an “analogue of reason,” 
however, Kant is further adverting to the soul (3) as a supersensible ground of 
activity. We infer that animate beings have this causal ground through an analogy 
with our own principle of life. Human beings are conscious of standing under the 
moral law, and because freedom is a condition of being necessitated by this law, 
we cognize the freedom of our will from a practical point of view (KpV, 5:42-43; 
Eth-V, 27:504-507).20 As free beings, we cognize ourselves not merely as we appear 
to ourselves through inner sense, but as spirits or intelligences that are responsible 
for what we do. And we are responsible because we are original causes. We are not 
necessitated by sensible natural causes, existing in space or time, but are 
supersensible beings, belonging to an intelligible world, with “the absolute 
spontaneity” required to be a free cause (e.g., KpV, 5:99). Thus, because we are 
conscious of the moral law, and are free, we infer there is a supersensible ground 
 
17 My translation: “anima, könnte man Seele, das Subjekt der Empfindung, animus, Gemüth das 
Subjekt der Gedanken, und spiritus Geist - als Subject der Spontaneitaet - nennen” (Met-D, 28:679-
680; also see Met-K2, 28:753; and contrast Anth-C, 25-16; Anth-P, 25:247, Anth-F 25:474). 
18 See also (DSS, 2:332), where it is implied that plants are not “sensible subjects.” 
19 (Met-V 28:450; see also, KU, 5:464n; Met-Her, 28:83-88; Met-L1, 28:276; Met-L2, 28:594; Met-K2, 
28:740; Met-D, 28:690; Kant picks up the phrase from Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §640; Ethica, 
§202). 
20 Because we cognize ourselves through pure apperception, Kant will claim it is obvious that we 
are also intelligible beings (A546/B574). Still, because we see non-rational animate beings move, 
but lack first person access to their minds and don’t believe they have pure apperception, it is our 
practical consciousness of our supersensible selves that will be relevant to the analogy. 
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of our activity. And it is through our reason that we think of ourselves as an 
intelligible being outside the causal order of sensible nature, yet able to freely 
originate acts within it.  
Kant holds, with Leibniz, that non-rational animate beings lack absolute 
spontaneity and are not intelligences, but are spiritual automata with the freedom 
of a turnspit (KpV, 5:97; R3855, 17:313; Met-L1, 28:267). After all, non-human 
animals seem to lack reason (Met-M, 29:906), and so do not cognize the moral law, 
but it is through this cognition that we infer freedom in our own case. For this 
reason, we do not think of their souls as supersensible grounds of free activity in 
the way we do our own. Nonetheless, animate beings have an inner principle of 
motion. And through their faculties of desire they act in accordance with their 
representations. Because of this, through their souls they exhibit a kind of self-
activity, even (relative) spontaneity,21 that is analogous to the kind of self-activity 
we exhibit, except that it is not free.22 We will see below that this relative 
spontaneity is sufficient for the attribution of a supersensible soul to non-rational 
animals. The grounds we have for attributing such a soul to plants will clearly be 
no stronger than the grounds we have for this attribution. If we find that there is 
 
21 Both in Kant’s earlier work and at the end of his life (e.g., DSS, 2:327n; Met-L1, 28:275; OP, 21:566, 
17:592), he will call all living beings self-active (selbst thätig), even spontaneous (Spontaneität).  In 
the unpublished introduction to the third Critique he divides the way purposiveness in nature is 
regarded into “intentional” and “natural (forma finalis naturae spontanea)” (20:235). Finally, at 
the end of this Critique, immediately before discussing the generation of maggots, he says in 
seeking the ground of the possibility of a natural end, it is “necessary to conceive of a particular 
kind of causality for it that is not, unlike the mechanism of natural causes, found in nature, since to 
the receptivity to various and different forms than those of which matter is capable in accordance 
with mechanism there must be added the spontaneity of a cause (which thus cannot be matter) 
without which no ground of those forms could be given” (KU, 5:411, my emphasis). Thus, even if in 
this passage it is not quite clear what the “particular kind of causality for it” is that imbues natural 
ends with the spontaneity of a cause that cannot be material, throughout Kant’s life he held all 
organisms, as natural ends, exhibit a spontaneity that dead matter does not. 
22 An anonymous referee for this journal has pressed me to clarify whether it is our freedom in the 
negative or the positive sense that is analogous to the lower powers of the non-rational animal. 
Freedom in the negative sense, remember, is independence from external causal influence, while 
freedom in the positive sense is a power for self-determination (e.g., KpV, 5:33). In the next section 
we will see that through their lower powers, as an anologon rationis, non-rational animals can seem 
self-determining. In this respect, since their acts seem to originate in their own powers, it is as 
though they were not only free in the negative, but also the positive sense, and the analogy is with 
freedom in the positive sense. Of course, in actuality, they are free in neither sense: instincts, or 
instincts and habits are the ultimate grounds of their self-activity, but they are not free. 
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reason to attribute supersensible souls to non-rational animals but not plants, 
however, then there may be reason to think Kant held only animals are alive. 
 
§3 – Organisms as natural ends and the analogy with life 
Before we turn to whether plants exhibit these three dimensions of life, we 
should examine Kant’s most significant discussion of plants, where we find him 
relying on a distinction between living beings and organisms. Kant holds matter, 
as matter, is inert; it is only moved by external forces or chemical powers. 
Organisms, however, are physical beings that seem to move themselves in a 
teleological way, which looks paradoxical. To exposit this apparent self-motion, 
and in developing his conception of organisms as natural ends, Kant relies on a 
number of analogies. It would be hard to miss, for example, Kant’s comparison of 
organisms to artifacts, and his repeated claims that it is as if organisms were made 
through the intention of an infinite intellect, like God’s.23 Throughout the third 
Critique Kant also develops an analogy between natural beauty and the inner 
natural perfection of organisms.24 He draws an analogy between the parts of a 
political state and an organism (KU, 5:375n). And in places Kant compares the self-
organizing powers of natural ends to our own rational powers (KU, 5:375).25  
Given what we have seen above, however, we might also expect Kant to 
appeal to life in order to exposit the distinctive motion of organisms. And in fact 
he does this in his main discussion of the power that grounds this motion in §65 of 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Still, after considering this analogy he 
concludes that “strictly speaking” the self-organizing powers of organisms are “not 
analogous with any causality that we know” (KU, 5:375). It seems that in part 
because of this, and in part because it is uncommon to attend to the distinction 
 
23 Prominent interpretations stressing this include McLaughlin (1990, 2014) and Ginsborg (2001, 
2004).  Ginsborg, for example, takes nature to be like an artifact, and the creator of nature (an 
infinite intellect) to be like an artifact’s maker. She argues that it is as if organisms were created by 
the infinite intellect through an idea of their species, in an intentional act of will. 
24
 Interpreters who have stressed this include Zuckert (2007) and Ginsborg (1997). 
25 Breitenbach (2009, 2014) has recently developed an interpretation of natural ends through this 
analogy with the faculty of practical reason, as itself goal directed and self-organizing. 
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between the concepts of <life> and <organized matter> (or <organism>),26 the 
analogy with life has received less attention than other analogies. Nonetheless, 
through plants, we will see that the analogy with life is fundamental to his 
explanation of the formative powers of organisms and it is no accident that Kant 
has placed this analogy at the center of his explanation of natural ends.  
Before we can turn to interpreting this analogy, however, we need to 
introduce Kant’s notion of a natural purpose or end (Naturzweck). He does this in 
§64 through the example of a tree and the way it exhibits the three causal powers 
particular to natural ends: reproduction, growth, and self-maintenance (or 
preservation). Roughly put, something is a natural end or purpose, according to 
Kant, if “it is cause and effect of itself” (5.370). This explanation includes two 
components, one of which natural ends share with artifacts, the other of which is 
distinctive.   
First, take a watch. “In a watch one part is the instrument [Werkzeug] for 
the motion of another” (5:374). There is a common form that unites all of the parts 
together into the whole, and this form ensures that each part is “present for the 
sake of the other.” In this way, then, there is an organization among the parts of 
the watch that ensures all of the parts have a reciprocal dependence on one 
another in bringing about the overall functioning of the watch. We find something 
similar in organisms: we take the roots and leaves of a tree, together with its other 
parts, to exist “only through all the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the 
others and on account of the whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ)” (5:374). 
Second, we not only conceive of a natural end as organized, we also 
conceive of it as “self-organizing” (5:374). So, unlike the watch, which cannot 
repair, grow, or reproduce itself, each part of the tree is productive of the other 
parts (5:371-2). It has the power to circulate sap, take in oxygen, repair damage, 
create seeds, etc. In this respect an organized being is more than a mere machine 
because it not only has “a motive power” (bewegende Kraft), but also “a formative 
 
26
 Even Ingensiep holds (2004, p. 115) that Kant does not always keep the contrast in view. We can 
avoid attributing this confusion to Kant, however, if we take him to hold that all organisms are 
alive. 
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power” (bildende Kraft) (5:375), where the latter power communicates a form to 
matter that does not have it, by organizing it. 
In section §65 Kant presents his concept of a natural end as a “determinate 
concept” in order to make precise this sense in which natural ends are related to 
themselves, reciprocally, as both cause and effects of themselves (KU, 5:370). In the 
case of the watch, the cause of the order and motion of the parts is external to it. It 
lies in the watch maker and her intention to build the watch according to her 
concept of it. This is the origin of the form of the watch. And in this respect the 
concept is the cause but not the effect of the watch. A natural end, however, is 
natural. We know of no natural cause that could imbue its parts with their form or 
their causality. Rather, as natural, its parts must themselves be cause and effect of 
their form, and of each other through that form. It is as if the watch and its parts 
were themselves the watch maker—as if they were the cause that brought the form 
into each other.27  
To describe the peculiarity of this kind of material causality, it will help to 
look at Kant’s notion of an end (Zweck). As Newton notes (2017, p. 521), Kant 
defines an end both (1) as “the concept of an object insofar as it at the same time 
contains the ground of the reality of this object” (KU, 5:180, my emphasis) and (2) 
as the “object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the 
former” (KU, 5:220, my emphasis). In the case of the watch, say, the end will be 
both the concept the watch maker has through which she produces the watch, as 
well as the watch itself that is produced. In the case of the tree, however, there is 
no known maker or intention. As Kant puts it, the “being that would possess the 
causality according to concepts appropriate for such a product” is unknown (KU, 
5:373). For this reason, there is no end, as a concept, that we cognize as the 
intention through which the tree is produced.  
Still, as many have noted, Kant holds that we judge that it is as though the 
organism was intentionally created in accord with a concept we posit, as if by some 
 
27
 Note, as an anonymous referee for this journal points out, while reproduction, growth, and self-
maintenance are characteristic of formative powers as we find them, nothing in the concept of a 
natural end or its formative power per se seems to dictate that these must be its activities.  
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supernatural creator. This concept or universal is the species-form of the 
organism.28 And one mark of an objective end like a watch or a tree is the order (or 
“perfection,” KU, 5:375; FI, 20:228) found in it. This order in the object is measured 
against “the concept of what sort of thing it is supposed to be” (KU, 5:227; FI, 
20:228). In the tree this concept serves as a normative standard by which we 
measure not only the order or perfection in the organism, but also its behavior. 
The quince tree should bloom in the spring and lose its leaves in the fall. If it fails 
to bloom, then we need to seek the ground of this failure outside its nature as a 
quince—say, in the composition of its soil or in a disease. In this respect, the 
species-form serves as a model (end as concept or idea) against which to measure 
the behavior of the organism (end as object or product). Insofar as the species-
form is supposed to be more than a mere model—insofar as it is also supposed to 
be, like the concept of the watch, the ideal cause of the organism—however, we 
know of no causal power that can bring this natural product about. 
The reason is not merely that this product exhibits an order for which we 
cannot find a cause, but that it itself seems to be its own cause. The organism, as a 
natural end or purpose, is cause and effect of itself insofar as, like the watch, the 
parts are conceived of as existing for the sake of all of the other parts on account of 
the whole, through their form. In this respect, Kant compares the parts of the 
natural end to instruments (Werkzeugen/organs) or gears (5:374), which the maker 
combines to make the product (e.g., the watch or end as object), in accordance 
with the idea of it (e.g., the watch plan or end as concept). But unlike the watch 
(and its gears), the parts of the natural end must also produce the other parts, in 
accord with their form as organs (e.g., roots, leaves, etc.), and produce the 
organism (e.g., tree) as the combination of these parts. In this respect, these 
organs are not merely brought together through the idea of an end in an external 
maker, but make themselves and their form, insofar as they both bring the form of 
 
28 Other interpreters who stress the normativity of the species-form concept include Ginsborg 
(2001, 2004), Huneman (2014), and Newton (2017). 
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the organism (end as concept) into matter that didn’t have it to create organs and 
bring this form into the organism as a whole (end as object).29  
It is in this that the formative power of the quince tree differs from the tin’s 
power to combust. In the case of phlogiston, we posit the idea of an element as the 
ground of combustibility, in order to unify the powers of metals and non-metals. 
Whether the power to combust is actualized depends merely on the presence or 
absence of certain external conditions (heat, etc.). Because of this it is mechanical. 
There is no principle in the thing that works to bring about or avoid these 
conditions—there is nothing in the tin which makes it so that it ought to burn or 
not. But (a) in the case of the quince (end as object), it seems as if its parts should 
be ordered according to its species-form (end as concept). The quince fruit’s 
astringent taste puts off many would be foragers, and the tree as a whole seems to 
work to maintain this order among its parts, etc. It thereby causes motions in 
matter to achieve these ends. 30 In this respect (b), it is as if the quince determined 
itself to motion and rest according to how instances of its species should be. For 
this reason, it is as if the quince were self-active or spontaneous—as if it were the 
origin of the movements in its parts—while the tin is inert. Finally, (c) it is non-
accidental that self-active powers are self-directed. The burning tin may happen to 
burn itself, but its power to burn can burn anything. If it also happens to suffer its 
own burning that is not properly self-activity, because the tin can equally burn 
other things. In contrast, the formative power of the quince is self-active because it 
is the power of its parts to work on one another.31  
 
29 This sketch of Kant’s account of the structure of the causal powers found in organisms combines 
elements from McLaughlin (1990; 2014), Ginsborg (2001, 2004), and Teufel (2011).  
30 The claim that it is distinctive of living beings, including plants, that they work to bring about 
ends, can be traced back at least to Aristotle (e.g., Physics, II.8). 
31 This entails that powers to act on the world are not self-active powers, which might seem 
surprising. After all, in exercising my power to act, I don’t merely have the power to move my 
limbs—to, say, lift my arm—but I also have the power to, say, lift my glass. Still, in exercising these 
powers I am acting on the glass (or the world), not on myself. It is, thus, no wonder that these 
powers are not self-active. Nonetheless, nothing precludes externally directed powers, like the 
power to lift a glass, that presuppose a self-active power, like the power for self-movement. (Thanks 
to Kathryn Lindeman for conversation on this point.) 
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Now, even considering only the natural formative power, Kant thinks we 
should be wary about claiming that organisms actually are natural ends. Being an 
end entails a creator with an intention, and with organisms we do not have insight 
into such a creating cause (e.g., KU, 5:400). In line with this, although Kant titles 
§65, “things, as natural ends, are organized beings,” he often seems to treat 
<organized being> or <organism> as empirical concepts, while he treats the 
concept <natural end> as an a priori idea of reason (e.g., KU, 5:405; FI, 20:233).32 
This a priori idea seems to then be specified in the empirical ideas of specific 
species-forms (e.g., KU, 5:373), and we judge that it is as if organisms fall under the 
concept <natural end> or the more determinate concept of their species-form.33 
Still, because we don’t cognize the intentionally acting cause that created 
organisms, we are not permitted to make a judgment about how the thing in fact 
is—i.e., about the intention with which it was in fact made—but can only make a 
judgment that guides our investigations in to it, as if it were made in accordance 
with the species-form we posit. 
 It is after he has developed the concept of a natural end through the 
analogy with an artifact that Kant asks: 
Perhaps one comes closer to this inscrutable property [i.e., the material causality 
particular to organisms] if one calls it an analogue of life: but then one must 
either endow matter as mere matter with a property (hylozoism) that contradicts 
its essence, or else associate with it an alien principle standing in communion 
with it (a soul), in which case, however, if such a product is to be a product of 
nature, organized matter as an instrument of that soul is {either} 34  already 
presupposed, and thus makes that product not the least more comprehensible, or 
else the soul is made into an artificer of this structure, and the product must be 
withdrawn from (corporeal) nature. Strictly speaking, the organization of nature is 
therefore not analogous with any causality that we know.  (KU, 5:375-376) 
 
32 For discussion of the importance of respecting this distinction, see Kreines (2005). 
33 Goy calls these “empirical apriori concepts of reason” (2017, p. 223). This is a contradictio in 
adjecto. Still, she is after the way that the a priori idea of a natural end (as concept) is made 
concrete in an empirical species-form. Kant often, however, takes a priori concepts (e.g., cause) to 
be made concrete in corresponding empirical ones (e.g., warming)—so much so that these are just 
empirical concepts. I discuss the case of cause and warming in detail in my “Kant and the Vicious 
Circle: Kant’s account of Particular Cognition” (MS). I discuss the general importance of making 
more abstract concepts concrete for Kant’s theoretical philosophy in my “Kant on Defining the 
Categories” (2014). 
34 The Cambridge ed. is missing the ‘either’: “jener Seele entweder schon voraussetzt” (my emph). 
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In the first part of this passage Kant quickly considers hylozoism in relation to 
organisms, and again rejects living matter as contradictory, presumably for the 
same reason we examined above: life involves inner powers and acts that are not 
spatial, and so cannot be physical. Because it is contradictory, this version of the 
analogy isn’t going to be of any use in helping us exposit the apparently self-active 
material causality particular to organisms. 
In the second part, Kant considers two options for how the immaterial 
soul35 could stand in communion with the organized body. On the first, the soul 
uses the body like a tool, as though it were, say, a pilot in a ship. He rejects this as 
a way of understanding the formative power of organisms because it doesn’t 
actually make this power more comprehensible. It is like trying to comprehend the 
self-maintaining powers of a horse by appealing to its rider. What we want to 
understand is the power in the body (the horse) to organize and produce itself. 
Proposing that there is an immaterial principle wielding or piloting that body is a 
non-sequitur. Such a principle presupposes the body (the ship or horse) is already 
given, with whatever formative powers of self-maintenance it may have. For this 
reason, although not contradictory, it’s not going to help us comprehend these 
self-active material powers. 
The second option Kant considers is that the soul is itself the craftsman of 
the body. Continuing with the ship analogy, we might think of the soul as though 
it were either the ship’s builder or an engineer, repairing engine damage while the 
voyage is underway, or both. Kant rejects this option because on it “the product 
must be withdrawn from (corporeal) nature.” But while it is clear why this 
proposal would withdraw the producer from material, physical nature, why would 
it also withdraw the product? After all, the product is the organism, and organisms 
are in the natural world. Well, as we just saw, in an organism the parts are both 
 
35 It is not entirely clear from the passage whether Kant is conceiving of the soul as a supersensible 
life principle, as a psychological subject, or both, and perhaps the way the analogy is illuminating 
does not hinge on determining this. Still, I suspect Kant holds it is analytic that there is something 
in itself (and so supersensible) that is the ultimate ground of any power, especially any self-active 
power (be it the physical formative power of an organism or the psychological representative power 
of a subject). If that is right, then the alien principle will at least be supersensible.  
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cause and effect of each other. They are both producer and produced. So the 
product is itself, in turn, the producer. But if that is the peculiar structure of the 
formative power in organisms as material beings, then because on our analogy the 
producer is immaterial, the product would need to be immaterial also. But that 
would remove the product from material, physical nature, and make the kind of 
causality in question not so much that of life (a soul’s communion with a body), as 
that of the connection between two immaterial things.  
Since the self-organizing power is not analogous to life in either way, the 
kind of causal powers we encounter in living beings as living beings cannot explain 
the natural self-organizing power found in organisms. This self-organizing power 
is an inner power of self-motion. So the self-organizing power cannot be 
accounted for through the mere mechanism of nature: matter’s outer or inner 
forces. Yet matter, as matter, is also inert. This puts Kant in a paradoxical 
situation. Certain material beings present us with a kind of self-motion that cannot 
be explained, either by the powers found in dead matter, or by appealing to 
immaterial powers, since these can’t figure in a science of such matter.  
Nonetheless, outside the context of natural teleology, Kant will sometimes 
appeal to life to exposit the inner motions of organisms. For example, in 
presenting why pre-established harmony is a worse view of the interaction 
between mind and body than physical influx, he claims that “the soul avails itself 
of the nerves as instruments [Werkzeuge] and through these immediately 
influences the remaining parts of the body; on the other hand the nerves are also 
the instruments [Werkzeuge] through which the body influences the soul” (Met-M, 
29:908, 1782/83). Here the body and the soul work on one another, each being the 
product and the producer of the other.  
This is strikingly similar to the way he has described the causality of the 
formative power, insofar as the parts of the organism are instruments (Werkzeuge) 
of one another and the whole (KU, 5:374), and the nerves are instruments 
(Werkzeuge) of the body and soul (Met-M, 29:908). This then suggests that the 
nerves are analogous to the parts of the body that are being used as instruments. 
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The parts of the body that are using the nerves would be analogous to the parts of 
the body that are using its other parts. And the soul that is acting on the body 
through the nerves is analogous to the whole organism, with its formative power, 
that is ordering the parts of the body in relation to one another through these 
parts. 
In this way, the third option for understanding the analogy with life can 
help make the formative power more comprehensible, even if it is not strictly 
analogous, and is not admissible in natural teleology. But so long as the context 
allows abstraction from the soul’s immateriality and the body’s materiality (as in 
psychology), it is permissible to appeal to the way that the soul grounds motions in 
the body. What we will see through examining the case of plants is that although 
cognitive judgments about souls are not admissible in natural science, the analogy 
with life is critical to Kant’s reflective exposition of the self-active formative powers 
of organisms. Specifically, souls provide a cohesive account of their psychological, 
supersensible, and physical powers and thereby account for their paradoxical self-
motion, even if this account is not a natural one. 
 
§4 – In favor of attributing an inner principle of motion to plants  
Above we saw that Kant attributes life to beings both because they move 
themselves and because they desire. Ingensiep claims that plants show that these 
two grounds of attribution are in tension and that as a result Kant’s notion of life, 
and even spontaneity, is up in the air (2004, p. 127-128). This is because he holds 
plants move themselves but don’t desire, while he holds that desire entails self-
movement. The second seems right. After all, any species that can desire—that can 
cause the objects of its representations—will have a means of causing these 
objects. For embodied beings, since at least some objects they desire are physical, 
they will cause changes in extended matter, and this entails self-movement. The 
other direction, however, is more controversial. As a result, we should look at the 
evidence for attributing life to plants on the basis of their motion before turning to 
the evidence for their representing or desiring.  
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The formative power of plants to reproduce, grow, and maintain 
themselves, seems to be an inner principle of self-motion, and so to make them 
alive in our first sense. After all, as we’ve seen, through their formative powers 
plants cause motions in matter that seem to be guided by their species-form. They 
move water, sap, cellulose, chlorophyll, etc. This motion has its ground in the tree 
itself, not in something outside it. So, merely because plants are organisms, they 
seem alive in the first sense. 
Perhaps, however, the kind of self-motion requisite for life is more robust. 
In the early 1766 essay Dreams of a Spirit Seer Kant discusses voluntary motion as 
the “undisputed characteristic mark of life,” which is something that plants lack.36 
Such motion is indicative of a faculty of choice, but not always free choice (MM, 
6:213). If Kant thought voluntary motion or a faculty of choice were required for 
life, then he would deny plants the relevant kind of principle of motion. Although 
at first it sounds like he thinks voluntary motion is required (DSS, 2:327n), as he 
goes on, it is clear he doesn’t. He claims that even though plants will lack this 
“external characteristic,” they do contain within themselves “a principle of inner 
life, namely, vegetation” (2:330-332). So although voluntary motion is the 
undisputed mark of life, in this work Kant takes life to extend further, to plants, 
and presumably this is because their nutritive activities involve (non-voluntary) 
self-motion.37 
 
36 This distinction in kinds of motion is like the one found in Aristotle between “movement and rest 
in respect of place” and “the movement involved in nutrition” (De An, II.2). Aristotle also denies 
plants voluntary motion or “the power to do or not to do” (NE, VI.12). 
37 I have found one passage from around the same time where Kant might be read as endorsing 
voluntary motion as a criterion for life (Met-L1, 28:275; 1770s), but in these same lecture notes he is 
also reported as claiming: “I do find a transition from the mineral kingdom into the plant kingdom, 
which is already a beginning of life” (28:205).  
If one were to interpret Kant as holding plants are not alive, one would lean on the first of 
these, together with Kant’s identifications of living beings with animals. One would argue that in 
fact the attribution of voluntary motion is required for the attribution of life, a supersensible soul, 
and a psychological subject. And one would then need to argue that the internally active formative 
power and its corresponding nutritive self-movement is insufficient for life, despite the explanation 
of life from Foundations. The key to all of this would likely be an argument that empirical 
consciousness is required for both life and for the unity of any psychological subject, and that the 
kind of account of unconscious plant desires and subjectivity that I present below is ultimately 
unworkable. 
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A bit earlier than Dreams, in Herder’s Metaphysics lecture notes, Kant is 
reported to have claimed, “the imperfect raises itself to the more perfect through 
the smallest degrees of perfection. E.g., the lifeless – plants, living plants, polyps, 
oysters, animals, until human beings” (Met-H, 28:42, 1762-64). It’s not clear here 
what divides mere plants from living plants—maybe he means to pick out Venus 
flytraps, etc. Still, at least some, if not all, plants are living and although he doesn’t 
spell out what life involves, presumably it is at least an inner principle of motion. 
In the Opus Postumum, at the end of Kant’s life, we see something similar: 
An organic (articulated) body is one in which each part, with its moving force, 
necessarily relates to the whole (to each part in its composition). 
The productive force in this unity is life. 
This vital principle can be applied a priori, from consideration of their mutual 
needs, to plants, to animals, to their relation to one another taken as a whole, and 
finally, to the totality of our world. (21:211) 38 
In this late passage Kant seems to claim that all organic beings or organisms are 
alive and have souls, and that this is an internal immaterial principle of motion. So 
here he seems to hold that if plants are organisms, then they are alive. 
Another nice piece of evidence that plants have a soul that entails at least a 
principle of self-motion can be found in the 1795 text that was included as an 
appendix to Samuel Sömmerring’s On the Organ of the Soul. Sömmerring’s work 
speculates on the role of ventricular liquid (Gehirnwasser) in facilitating mind-
body interaction. Although Kant wants to avoid the contradiction of ascribing a 
place in space to something that is merely inner, he endorses Sömmerring’s claim 
that the ventricular liquid is “the matter that makes possible the unifying of all 
sensory representations in the mind” (12:32).39 Kant even suggests that it is the 
chemical decomposition of the liquid that might make the requisite complex 
causal processes possible, and gives as evidence the following:   
 
38 Still, two (quite similar) conflicting Opus Postumum passages where Kant contrasts vegetative 
with living bodies are 21:541 and 21:565. A number of others, however, suggest all organic beings, 
including plants, have souls and are alive (e.g., 22:97; 22:99; 22:59). 
39 The idea of a fluid medium is not new to Kant with Sömmerring (E.g. FEV, 1:212, 1754; KU, 5:349, 
Anth-F, 25:625; Met-K2, 28:753, 1790s; compare also Kant’s discussions of nerves (e.g., Met-H, 
28:854) and their close association with irritability and the vital or vague sense involved in, say, 
shuddering (e.g., 1782/3, MM, 29:882).) This thought that water is the key to the vitality of plants is 
also neither new with Kant nor Sömmerring. For example, it is critical to Caspar Friedrich Wolff’s 
(1759, Pt. 1) extensive discussion. 
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If one also considers what an immeasurable manifoldness of partly volatile matters 
the realm of plants produces from that ordinary water, presumably through 
decomposition and other kinds of connection, then one can imagine what 
manifoldness of tools the nerves encounter at their ends in the water of the brain 
(which might be nothing more than ordinary water). (12:34) 
Here, of course, Kant is not directly claiming that plants have souls. He is only 
drawing an analogy between their use of water and the use of ventricular liquid or 
‘brain water.’ Nonetheless, because he is defending the claim that it is the 
decomposition of ventricular liquid that is the matter that is the material 
condition for the unification of sensory representations in us, it isn’t much of a 
stretch to think the decomposition of water in plants is supposed to be the matter 
that makes possible whatever kind of psychological subject they have.  
 
§5 – In favor of attributing representations to plants 
For these reasons, insofar as any being with an inner principle of self-
motion is alive, it seems Kant would attribute life to plants. But would Kant also 
claim plants represent or desire? Or as Kant might put it, do plants “have 
psychological instead of mechanical causality” in that they “produce actions by 
means of representations and not by bodily movements” (KpV, 5:98)? This is what 
interpreters like Ingensiep, Zammito, and Newton would deny, in part on textual 
grounds. The texts where Kant directly discuses whether at least some plants sense 
or desire, however, do not conclusively favor this denial.  
In Dreams of a Spirit Seer, Kant refers to the “irritability” (Irritabilität) of 
some plants (2:331) and he holds that explaining irritability in terms of the 
physical, mechanical properties of the body is dubious (Met-K2, 28:753). In one of 
his early logical reflections he discusses sensitive plants [empfindliche Pflantze] 
(R1570, 16:7, 1754-5), and these texts suggest that he thought some plants could 
sense. (See also Anth, 7:175, where he suggests plants do something like sleep).40 
Still, his use of the subjunctive in describing a sensitive plant [empfindliche 
Pflantze/Planta sensitiva] in the Physical Geography suggests it is merely “as 
though it had sensations” (9:364). And in the Metaphysics of Morals he seems to 
 
40 Thanks to Jonas Indregard for reminding me of this passage. 
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deny sensation to plants: “The first (nonhuman) objects can be mere inorganic 
matter (minerals), or matter organized for reproduction though still without 
sensation (plants)” (6:442). Overall, I take the evidence to suggest that Kant denied 
sensation to plants. 41  
When it comes to desires, there is less direct evidence. Still in the margin of 
a fragmentary transcript of his 1792 lectures on logic, Kant is reported to have said: 
“Faculty of desire. This holds for plants, too, the flytrap. They seek air and sun and 
water” (Log-D, 24:772). This seems in line with the powers Kant attributes to plants 
in core texts like the Critique of Judgment, at least interpreted one way. As we saw, 
there he claims we must at least take plants to have a formative power (bildende 
Kraft), and this is arguably a drive (Trieb), because he seems to identify it with 
Blumenbach’s formative drive (Bildungstrieb/nisus formativus) (KU, 5:424).42 If this 
power is a drive, then because Kant will identify drives with instincts (Instinkte) 
(e.g., Anth-DW, Ko249, 1791-3; Anth-F, 25:613; Met-D, 28:690), and classify these as 
a kind of desire (Begierde) (Anth-F, 25:584), then drives are also desires. 43 So if the 
formative power in plants is a drive, and drives are instincts, then plants have a 
kind of desire, and thus a faculty of desire. Finally, if plants have drives, then they 
have desires, and in this respect they represent. Thus, although the textual 
evidence is somewhat inconclusive, overall it seems to suggest the strange position 
that plants have desires but not sensations.44  This is strange because on a 
 
41 Compare Locke, for whom “perception puts the difference between animals and vegetables,” but 
who took the movements of plants to be merely mechanical (Essay, Bk. II, ch. ix, ¶11&12). 
42 Although since Kant only calls it a drive when discussing Blumenbach, who calls it a drive, we 
might take that as evidence that Kant did not, in his own voice, think of it as one. Further, as we 
saw in note 1, Blumenbach seems to treat this ‘drive’ as a merely material principle, and not as 
indicative of a perceiving or representing soul, so not clearly as a desire in Kant’s sense. And in this 
discussion at KU, 5:424, there is nothing that suggests this drive is more than merely physical. 
43 Instincts have an interesting structure. On the one hand, they are actual desires that can be for 
an object one has never known (Anth-DW, Ko249, Anth-F, 25:584). On the other, they can ground 
inclinations (e.g., FS, 2:60) or drives (Anth-F, 25:584), and in this sense they are like innate 
propensities that in the right circumstances ground inclinations (e.g., Anth-F, 25:580; note: the 
Cambridge ed. of the Anthropology Lectures translates both ‘Trieb’ and ‘Instinct’ as ‘instinct.’). 
(Also, compare Leland (§7, 2020) on Kant’s instincts.) 
44
 If this is right, then Kant would agree with Blumenbach that plants don’t have sensation, as was 
noted in footnote 1. We will see that Kant might still, however, attribute subjective sensation or 
feeling to them.  
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traditional way of thinking, desire presupposes sensation or perception,45 and for 
good reason: a faculty of desire—a capacity for making the object of desire 
actual—seems to presuppose a faculty to represent what is actual. We will return 
to this, and to the philosophical case for plants representing below. 
 
§6 – The supersensible souls of plants? 
We ascribe souls to beings on the basis of self-motion or representations, 
and usually ascribe representations on the basis of such motion. Another inference 
we draw on the basis of such motion is to the existence of a soul as a supersensible 
ground of activity, if we hold there is one. There are two main arguments for why 
we should not draw this inference in the case of plants. Both of these, however, 
will also apply to any non-rational being. So the same reasons that would lead us 
to attribute a supersensible soul to non-rational animals also apply to plants. 
The first argument against attributing a supersensible ground of activity to 
plants holds that in the Critique of Teleology it can seem that Kant claims we 
cannot attribute souls to any non-rational organisms, but can only treat them as if 
they had such souls, for the sake of our investigations. After all, he denies that we 
can make determinative teleological judgments about material beings, including 
organisms, at least insofar as these would be theoretical judgments, not practical 
judgments about free beings (KU, 5:417). With ourselves and other human beings, 
we do cognize their intentions and their free causality, from a practical point of 
view (KU, 5:484). This justifies a moral teleology in our case (KU, 5:461), although 
not a theoretical one. But as spiritual automata, non-rational animate beings are 
like a clockwork that some other being wound-up (Eth-V, 27:505). They lack 
freedom, and so they lack the moral principle on which our teleology is grounded. 
 
45 This is how Aristotle was generally understood, because: “The nutritive faculty alone belongs to 
plants; both this and the perceptual faculty belongs to others. But if the perceptual faculty, then 
also the desiderative faculty: desire is appetite, spirit, and wish.” (De An, II.3, 414a33-b1; also II.2, 
II.12) Notice, though, that although he will often infer from sense-perception to pleasure and pain, 
and from there to desire (De An, II.3, 414b1-5; II.2, 413b20-24), he does not, as far as I can find, infer 
from pleasure and pain to sense perception. If he doesn’t, that leaves open the possibility of a 
creature that has something like pleasure and pain, and desire, but does not have sense-perception, 
which is the view that will be in question for Kant. 
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From a theoretical point of view, although it seems we can affirm the existence of a 
“supersensible substrate of nature,” we can determine nothing affirmative about it 
“except that it is the being in itself of which we know merely the appearance” (KU, 
5:422, 412, 409). And, although we will see this isn’t right, it can seem one thing we 
cannot affirm about this substrate is that it includes the supersensible souls of 
organisms.  
Furthermore, Kant claims that we can attribute minds to other beings only 
through an analogy with our own case (e.g., A353-A354; A346/B404). In this we can 
abstract away from certain features of our minds—e.g., self-consciousness—when 
thinking about other kinds of subjects—e.g., those of non-rational animals (KU, 
5:464n; Log-D, 24:772; Met-V, 28:449; Met-H, 28:116). But in all cases, even with 
respect to other people, the inference seems somewhat speculative insofar as it is 
“empirical” (JL, 9:133). Presumably this becomes more attenuated the greater the 
differences. And when the representational powers in question are as distant from 
our own as a plant’s, we should expect the attribution to be quite tentative.  
These two arguments are connected. Kant will claim that analogical 
inferences are made through the reflective power of judgment and that they “do 
not determine the object, but only the mode of reflection concerning it, in order to 
attain its cognition” (JL, 9:132). This mode of reflection is exactly the kind of 
reflection we engage in when we observe the motion of animals, attribute 
representations to them, and form teleological judgments about them that guide 
our mechanical investigations. Because of this, the first point about the ascription 
of souls is an instance of the second, and our merely reflective teleological 
judgments about plants and animals are grounded in an analogy with our own 
cognitive moral teleology.  
Still, the first argument will not stand as stated. Although Kant takes our 
reflective teleological judgments about non-rational animals and plants to merely 
guide our mechanical investigations, he would resist concluding that we cannot 
ascribe supersensible souls to them. As we’ve seen, in many passages he attributes 
a principle of life to them, and in many of these he thinks of this not merely as a 
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ground of self-motion or representations, but also as a supersensible being.46 This 
is especially clear when he claims animate beings might be immortal (Met-M, 
29:906-907; Met-H, 28:116-117; Met-L1, 28:276). It is also clear here: 
any principle of life must be counted among the intelligibilia, thus the soul as well. 
But one knows nothing about the intelligible except its relation to the appearances 
in the sensible world for which it is the substrate. […] This is also the ground of our 
ignorance with regard to all organized beings and beings that organize matter, the 
possibility of which, since it rests on a principle of life, cannot be understood.
 47
 
Here Kant is claiming that we can know that souls, as principles of life, are 
supersensible objects and that we cannot know anything about this object except 
that it is the substrate of the organism with which it is associated. 
Of course, the attribution of a supersensible soul to organized beings 
happens by way of an analogy with our own case. When we act, we freely choose to 
move our bodies. This motion is grounded in a spontaneous free will and reason. 
Kant holds we describe the actions of non-rational animals, like beavers, through 
an analogy with this free cause. We cannot infer that its acts are free—at best it 
only has an analogue of reason—but through the shared genus of <living being> 
we can attribute representations to it.48 This attribution, since it happens through 
the genus life, also seems to warrant the attribution of a supersensible soul or life 
principle. Because both of these attributions happen by way of this analogy, both 
are merely reflective; both can only regulate natural investigations, not be the 
result of them. And the same will hold for plants. Nonetheless, with respect to the 
supersensible, non-rational animals and plants are on all fours. Just as Kant 
attributes life to the beaver on the basis of its self-motion, he would attribute life 
to a quince tree on the basis of its self-movement, and in both cases this seems to 
involve the reflective attribution of a principle of life, as an intelligible 
supersensible ground of activity.  
 
46 Just as he holds we can know from a theoretical point of view that we have a supersensible soul, 
although we cannot have any material, synthetic knowledge of it (e.g., A355). 
47 (R4534, 17:585, 1772–78? (1790s?)). Also compare: “we do not have insight into” “the growth of 
plants” (Log-Bl, 24:133; 1771).(Thanks to Tom Marré for pointing me to R4534.) 
48 (5:464n) Kant consistently contrasts his own view with Descartes, claiming Descartes was wrong 
to think of animals as mere machines (e.g., Met-V, 28:449; Met-L2, 28:594). 
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Perhaps, however, with respect to representations there is a relevant 
disanalogy that can help us develop our second argument concerning the large 
degree of difference between us and plants. In the case of the beaver Kant holds it 
has an analogue of reason because of its “artistic actions” and “constructions” 
which are like our own (5:464n). In the case of a quince tree, however, we find an 
organism that does not build anything other than itself or its quinces. And in this 
respect its products at most exhibit a unity like that of our own body, whose 
autonomic functions do not seem to require representation by their possessor. For 
this reason, although the quince and the beaver both warrant the reflective 
attribution of supersensible souls, perhaps only the beaver warrants the reflective 
attribution of representations.  
 
§7 – Against attributing representations to plants 
We’ve seen that the textual evidence does not clearly favor denying 
representations or desires to plants. Still, there are also two philosophical 
arguments that might seem to support such a denial.  
The first argument holds that plants lack the unity required to be a subject 
of representations and thus to have representations at all. In the Second 
Paralogism Kant makes clear that thinking requires a certain unity to the thinking 
subject (see especially, A352 and B407-408; Met-M, 29:905). In the early 1790s K2 
transcripts, Kant extends the same argument to the representations of non-
thinking subjects. There he argues that “all representations refer to one subject” 
and that a “unified representation can occur in one subject only as a unity. A being 
can therefore have no representations without this absolute unity of the subject.”49  
Now, the powers that account for this unity of the subject in a non-rational 
animal, and which give it its analogue of reason, are its reproductive imagination 
 
49 (Met-K2, 28:754). This unity of the subject need not entail (3) a single supersensible soul. So long 
as there is (2) a unified subject of representations—a formal unity—the thinking intelligible being 
itself can be as composite as any material being (A353). This goes for plants, non-rational animals, 
and even us, from a theoretical point of view. 
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and faculty for apprehension. 50  Apprehension, however, requires empirical 
consciousness (see, e.g., B202; Anth 7:134n), and there is no evidence that Kant 
attributes reproductive imagination, apprehension, or empirical consciousness to 
plants.51 If plants do not have these powers, and do not have the kind of unified 
subject of sensation that non-rational animals possess, then that would seem to be 
sufficient evidence for denying them representations.52 
The second argument, implicit in Newton (2017, p. 520), is more direct. 
Kant holds that pleasure (Lust) is a conscious state (KU, 5:220). Specifically, it is 
feeling the furtherance of our life activities (KU, 5:278; also Anth, 7:231), or “the 
consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the 
subject, for maintaining it in that state” (KU, 5:220). “Life is the faculty of a being 
to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire” (KpV, 5:9n). And in places 
Kant will claim things like “each desire <appetition> is grounded in the sense of 
anticipated pleasure <sensum voluptatis praevisi>” (Met-L2, 28:587). On this basis, 
the second argument holds that since desires are grounded in anticipated pleasure 
and pleasures are conscious states, all desiring beings are capable of such states. 
 
50 It is more usual for him to refer to their reproductive imaginations, as say in the discussions of 
the brute soul in the metaphysics lectures, but he will also refer to their faculty for apprehension, as 
in the 1792 letter to Beloselsky (11:345). 
51 There is one argument for Kant’s attributing a kind of consciousness to plants, beyond simply 
tollensing the ponens. As Newton notes (p. 522), plants separate out and assimilate nutrients like 
water and minerals, while not taking in substances that do not further their formative powers (KU, 
5:371). Such separation and assimilation may be a simple kind of acquaintance (kennen/nocere), 
insofar as this is a matter of distinguishing a thing from others through comparison (R:2394, 
16:343). Acquaintance is so closely related to perception and representing with consciousness, 
however, that sometimes Kant does not seem to distinguish them (E.g., Log-W, 24:845-846). So, 
this could seem to suggest a sense in which plants are conscious. Still, in other places Kant divides 
acquaintance from consciousness, and both usually seem to entail not just distinguishing and 
comparing things, but also representing things “as to their identity and diversity” (Log-D, 24:730; 
Log-Ph, 24:418), and it seems doubtful that plants do this. So overall, if plants do exhibit a simple 
kind of acquaintance with things, it would seem to be a kind of acquaintance that does not also 
count as perception or involve consciousness. 
52 If this were Kant’s view, then it would look reminiscent of how Aristotle is generally understood 
because of claims like this: “Perception is what is capable of receiving perceptible forms without the 
matter, as wax receives the seal of a signet ring without the iron or gold […] this is why plants do 
not perceive, even though they have one psychic part and are affected in a way by the objects of 
touch, since they are cooled and heated. The reason is that they do not have a mean, nor do they 
have the sort of principle for receiving the forms of perceptible things; rather, they are affected with 
the matter” (De An, II.12, 424a33). 
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Plants, however, are not capable of conscious states. So, plants don’t feel pleasure 
or desire, and are not alive. 
 
§8 – Plant desire 
We saw above that at least in Dreams, Kant thought plants do not have a 
faculty for voluntary motion or animal choice. We also just saw that we do not 
have reason to attribute pleasure as a conscious state to them. Nor did it seem we 
had sufficient grounds to attribute to them a unified representing subject, at least 
in any sense we are used to. For these reasons, the temptation should be strong to 
conclude that Kant thought plants lacked the requisite kind of psychological 
causality for the attribution of life, even if he held that they have a vegetative soul. 
Nonetheless, I think there is good reason to resist this temptation and hold 
that Kant would reflectively ascribe representations to plants, in much the same 
way as non-rational animals. The arguments of the last section are only compelling 
if a creature must have a faculty of empirical consciousness in order to be capable 
of representing. Perhaps this is true, but perhaps not. Non-rational animals have 
an analogue of reason because they have the powers of reproductive imagination, 
apprehension, and empirical consciousness. Plants will lack these, and thus also 
lack pleasure and desire, as they are explained in the passages just quoted. Nothing 
in the first argument, however, shows that plants lack another kind of unity of 
subject. Moreover, there is evidence that there are forms of pleasure and desire 
that do not require consciousness. For example, Kant claims, “the feeling that 
urges the subject to remain in the state he is in is agreeable [angenehm]; but the 
one that urges him to leave it is disagreeable. Combined with consciousness, the 
former is called enjoyment [Vergnügen] (voluptas), the latter lack of enjoyment 
(taedium)” (Anth, 7:254). Here enjoyment (Vergnügen/voluptas) is explained in 
very similar terms as pleasure (Lust) above, but agreeableness seems to lack 
consciousness.53 And while plants lack consciousness, if Kant is committed to 
 
53
 As a first pass at what Kant could mean by the merely agreeable, again, the comparison with 
Aristotle might be helpful. Aristotle holds that plants undergo heatings and chillings, which are the 
physical states that he takes to accompany pleasures and pains (MA, 701b19-702a1). He also holds 
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them representing, then it seems, he would attribute to them a simple faculty of 
feeling, capable of feeling agreeableness, and a correspondingly simple faculty of 
desire, that we might characterize as a faculty of drives to pursue the agreeable.  
Is he, however, committed to their representing? In the passage above from 
the Metaphysical Foundations we saw that Kant claims, “we know no other internal 
principle in a substance for changing its state except desiring” (MAN, 4:544). And 
in attributing desire on the basis of internal motion, he goes further: 
An internally active power in a being is called life, our own state is a state of 
representation <status repraesentativus>, accordingly in a living being we can 
always imagine a power of representation <vim repraesentativam>; motive powers 
cannot work otherwise than by outer causes, they are therefore also determined 
only externally, internally I cognize nothing, but should it be living then it has a 
faculty for acting from an inner principle, and this principle is a subject that has 
powers of representation <vires repraesentativas>. (Met-V, 28:448-449, 1784/85) 
This suggests that any time we find a being with an internally active power or 
principle, we can also (at least reflectively) judge that it represents, and that any 
such being is a subject that has powers of representation (see also Met-L2, 28:594; 
1790/91). If that is right, then not only does desiring entail self-motion, but also 
any being with an inner principle of self-motion has a faculty of representation, 
specifically desire. So because plants have an inner principle of non-voluntary self-
motion, it seems that Kant holds we should reflectively judge that plants represent. 
For these reasons, despite the somewhat inconclusive textual evidence of 
§5, I think we should hold that Kant would attribute representations to plants, if 
we can find a plausible account of what these representations would be, and can 
respond to the objections of the last section. As we saw, Kant did comment on 
phenomena like phototropism, sensitive plants, and Venus flytraps. Here we see 
 
that there are states that are good or bad for them, in virtue of the nutritive part of their soul. Thus, 
if, as it sometimes seems, pleasure for Aristotle was merely the “unimpeded activity of a natural 
state” (EN, VII.12, 1153a14-15), then plants would feel it. But they don’t. And the reason seems to be 
that they lack awareness or the perceptual mean, as we saw in the last note. This is because 
Aristotle holds “that being pleased and being pained are the actualization of the mean of the 
perceptual faculty in relation to what is good or bad insofar as they are such” (De An, III.7, 431a10-
12). So although plants do not feel pleasure or pain because they lack a perceptual faculty, they will 
strive for what is good for them and avoid what is bad for them. Insofar as this activity is 
unimpeded, it will be like Kant’s state of agreeableness. The question is how much more there is to 
this state, since Kant too denies plants awareness, after all. (Thanks to Chris Frey for discussion of 
the issues raised in this note.) 
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plants responding to their environment, and as a result perhaps he would admit 
that these phenomena are indicative of some minimal sensory faculty. 
Nonetheless, we saw Kant claim in the Metaphysics of Morals that plants do not 
sense. And not all dimensions of reproduction, growth, or self-maintenance seem 
to involve representing things outside of the organism. So, if we are going to find a 
plausible account of plant representations, it would be best if any growth or self-
maintenance would warrant their reflective attribution. 
Still, by the end of §5, we were in the strange, even philosophically 
uncomfortable position of attributing simple desires, but not sensations to plants. 
Here, I think the distinction between objective and subjective sensations from 
Kant’s introduction of the agreeable at the beginning of the third Critique can 
help.54  There he explains the agreeable as “that which pleases [gefällt] the 
senses in sensation” (KU, 5:205). But then points out that the word “sensation” 
(Empfindung) can designate either an objective or a subjective representation of 
the senses, and: 
The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as perception of 
an object of sense; but its agreeableness belongs to subjective sensation, through 
which no object is represented, i.e., to feeling, through which the object is 
considered as an object of satisfaction (which is not a cognition of it). (KU, 5:206) 
In this respect, all agreeableness is subjective sensation. Because this is incapable 
of yielding cognition, however, Kant calls it “feeling,” and reserves the use of 
“sensation” for objective sensation. In the passages back in §5 the kind of sensation 
that Kant seemed have in mind were objective sensations, not feelings. If that is 
right, then although plants don’t generally have objective sensations, they may still 
in a minimal sense feel. 
If the mere feeling of agreeableness is the kind of ‘sensation’ plants could 
have, what kind of desire might they be capable of? “The faculty of desire is the 
faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the objects of these 
representations” (MM, 6:211). In this way Kant defines the faculty of desire as the 
power that operates through a distinct form of representation: one that causes the 
 
54 Thanks to Colin McLear for suggesting this. 
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actuality of its object.55 Of course, sometimes there are impediments. But even 
when I am impeded, desire moves me. It is efficacious representation. It is a 
“striving (nisus) to be a cause” (MM, 6:356; also Anth-F, 25:577). This is the form 
that all desiring shares. 
Specific kinds of desire are efficacious in different ways. For God there is no 
distinction between desiring and cognizing—no distinction between practical and 
theoretical representation. By knowing his own will God knows what is. And there 
is no gap between his knowledge and its object: in knowing, it is, and it is done.  
For this reason, God is not affected by objects, and so lacks a faculty of 
feeling. Feeling “is the effect of a representation […] upon a subject” (6:212n). 
Agreeableness and pleasure are kinds of feeling. We saw above that agreeableness 
“urges the subject to remain in the state he is in” (Anth, 7:254). And pleasure (or 
enjoyment) is agreeableness with consciousness of this agreeableness (KU, 5:220). 
Although human beings have a faculty of feeling, in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, Kant is careful not to build into his definition of the faculty of desire that 
the feeling of pleasure must ground its determination (5:9n). His ambition is to 
show that pure reason can be practical, that it can move us to act, and that it can 
therefore determine our faculty of desire. If Kant succeeds, then he will have 
shown that we are free to choose whether our faculty of desire is, at a given 
moment, rationally or sensibly determined. But building in that pleasure must 
determine the will would rule this out.  
In us, either pleasure or practical reason is the determining ground of 
desire. Since pleasure is conscious, either way, the determining ground of desire 
involves awareness or consciousness. For non-rational animals, since they lack 
reason, there is no freedom. Their faculty of choice is always determined through 
feeling. Because they have a capacity for empirical consciousness, they will feel 
pleasure. So, in addition to the bare agreeableness of, say, the taste of an apple, 
both my pleasure and the pleasure of a horse involves an awareness of this 
agreeableness. Further, this consciousness of the agreeableness of eating the apple 
 
55 I have borrowed this point from Engstrom (2009, p. 27). 
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leads us both to anticipate more pleasure, if we keep eating our apples. This 
present pleasure, and this anticipation of future pleasure, both ground our sensible 
desires—our inclinations—to eat apples. Because both this pleasure and this 
anticipation are conscious, the desire they ground is conscious too. For this reason, 
the capacity for empirical consciousness will be distinctive of both inclinations. 
But whereas I am free to ignore my inclination in order to do what I ought, the 
horse has no conception of ought, and so is not.  
Now, in the formative powers of plants we find them working for the sake 
of ends. This is striving. The quince tree and its parts take in nutrients, sustaining 
and growing further parts, so as to bring about and maintain an order dictated by 
its species-form. Such self-active striving, we saw, is the kind of inner self-motion 
that separates organisms from dead matter. Further, we saw that any inner activity 
warrants the attribution of a representing subject. Because of this, and because the 
inner activity is striving, the representations attributed to this subject are desires. 
And so just as we attribute desires to non-rational animals on the basis of their 
striving, we should also attribute desires to plants on the basis of theirs. But as we 
do not find grounds to attribute free choice to non-rational animals, we do not 
find grounds to attribute consciousness to plants. They have efficacious 
representations that bring about and maintain their states, but no awareness. For 
this reason, just as Kant claims the faculties for representing (especially desiring) 
in non-rational animals are different in quality, not merely in degree or quantity, 
from the faculties of human beings (Met-L2, 28:594; Met-D, 28:690; Met-L1, 
28:276), the faculty of desire in a plant will be different in quality, not merely in 
degree, from that of a non-rational animal.  
What, however, is the structure of plant desire? The agreeable, remember, 
is a feeling that urges the subject to remain in the state he is in, while the 
disagreeable is the opposite. They concern a present state of the subject. And 
because these feelings are unconscious, plants could have them. In the case of 
pleasure, in addition to agreeableness there was consciousness of this 
agreeableness, which engendered anticipation of future pleasure. Such 
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consciousness, and such anticipation, will be absent in our quince. So the 
anticipatory component of the horse’s desire will also be lacking. All that is left to 
the quince’s desires are representations that: (a) are a striving to remain in a state 
that produces an agreeable feeling, or (b) are a striving to leave a state that 
produces a disagreeable feeling.  
An example: suppose it’s been dry lately. Our quince’s parched state is 
disagreeable. So it strives to seek out water, to change its disagreeable state. 
Suppose a creek runs to its left, and its left roots absorb more water than its right. 
This state is agreeable, and so the tree puts its energies into growing its roots on its 
left, not its right, so as to keep its left side in the state that it is in. It is, then, the 
quince’s desires to flee its dehydrated state and to remain in its hydrated state that 
cause this lopsided growth.56 But the quince does not objectively sense the water 
flowing past its roots, anticipate sucking up the water, or remember its parched 
state later.57 
 
§9 – The representing subjects of plants 
Still, what of the first objection: what kind of unity should we reflectively 
attribute to the plant subject, given that it only has these limited faculties of 
feeling and desire? We reflectively hold that the plant is an organism, so acts as a 
natural end. This means that through its formative power it seems to order its 
parts according to its species-form. We just saw that part of how it seems to do 
this is through simple desires. But how does it coordinate these desires? How is it 
that the quince, through its desire for water, grows on its left but not its right side?  
What if each part of a plant is imbued with its own subject? What if because 
the roots on the left come into contact with more water, desire in their subject is 
strong and lots of growth is stimulated, but desire in the subject of the left side 
roots is weaker, and so less growth is stimulated? Kant would reject this. 
 
56
 Although the example is with pleasure and nerves, not plants, compare: Anth-F, 25:559. 
57 In conversation, Alexandra Newton has suggested to me that Kant has a place for plant 
habituation, and so the simulation of memory. This may be. I will not comment on it further. 
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Immediately prior to the argument that any representation requires some unity of 
subject, he points out:  
A living being has only one soul, this is a principle in psychology. The 
consciousness of the unity of my soul follows already from the consciousness of my 
subject. Even if we think several principles of life in the body, which are unified, so 
that much life is united in one, then this is still only one soul. One wants to 
explain irritability from the mechanical properties of body. This is still dubious. 
Perhaps an overflowing fluid of the nerves, which looks like slime and clothes the 
muscles, is the cause of it. With its head, a cut-up wasp grabs its stomach, and the 
latter defends itself with its stinger. The land crab can leave its claw, and this still 
continues to pinch the body that it has grabbed. It is therefore not unlikely that 
multiple lives are concentrated in the body under a single principle. Just because 
several principles of life are in various parts of the animal, there are not on that 
account several animals. (Met-K2, 28:753, 1790s; also see OP, 22:481, 22:418. 
Compare Aristotle, De An, II.2, 413b17-24) 
Although in most contexts Kant just identifies the principle of life with the soul, 
here he distinguishes them. In §2 we saw life was the interaction between a 
material body and an immaterial soul. This immaterial soul was both a 
psychological subject and a supersensible ground of activity. In this passage, 
however, the principles of life seem to be (3) the supersensible grounds of activity, 
while the soul is (2) the psychological subject. After all, there may be multiple 
principles of life in an organism, each controlling the inner motion of a part, yet 
there is only one soul.58  
For these reasons, if plants are alive and have a subject of representations, 
there would only be (2) one soul, one subject of representations. Because we can 
grow a new plant from a cutting, or because we can graft one part of a plant into 
another, we can attribute multiple (3) principles of life to them. Nonetheless, there 
would be only one subject under which the actions of the other life principles are 
ordered. In this way, only the quince as a whole, not its roots and its leaves, would 
represent. And this is what we might expect given that the left side roots grow 
more than the right, and the quince must coordinate the use of its formative 
power.  
 
58 This is not unlike Leibniz’s dominant monads, except the unity of subject is not grounded in the 
singularity of (3) an intelligible being. Rather, it is (2) a very minimal merely ‘logical’ unity, 
analogous to the merely “logical identity of the I” (A363), but stripped of all capacity for 
consciousness. 
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But should we attribute such a subject to plants, and in what sense might 
there be a subject at all without consciousness? The inclinations in me and the 
horse seemed to at least involve consciousness both of the state to be attained and 
of not being in this state. Further, it can seem critical to such inclinations that 
there is an associative, anticipatory relationship between representations and at 
least some empirical consciousness ordering these in inner sense. After all, it is 
through smelling the roast and the loaf, anticipating the pleasure of eating either, 
and comparing these (in empirical consciousness), that the dog goes for the roast 
(FS, 2:60). But how are representations to be coordinated, if not through, at least, 
obscure consciousness?  
As a first pass, it is worth noting that the species-form of the plant will 
determine which states are agreeable or disagreeable. The material conditions of 
the plant’s formative power fixes the plant’s needs. This does not seem to require 
that plants represent their species-form. That form, through the physical operation 
of the formative power, is inscribed in their organisms. It is built into their bodies 
because they are an instance of their kind. It is because of this species-form that 
plants will have the instincts that they have. And it is these instincts that will 
ground their simple desires. 
Still, how can the quince grow in this direction and not that? How can it 
sometimes put more energy into growing its leaves than its roots? At this point I 
can only speculate as to Kant’s answer, but indulge me for a moment. The subject 
of non-rational animals, through its representations, not only acts on itself 
through moving its limbs—its body—but acts on itself through attending to 
representations simultaneously and comparing them, as with the roast and the 
loaf. Because the dog anticipates a greater pleasure, it chooses to go for the roast. 
The plant, however, has no power for attention, comparison, or choice. This is 
because it lacks empirical consciousness and inner sense, which are requisite for 
all three. 
For this reason, we are pushed to hold that plants cannot combine 
representations, outside perhaps the generation of specific desires from specific 
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feelings, and that their subjects are almost as manifold and diverse as these 
representations. Can we then, perhaps, divide the powers of the non-rational 
animal from the plant by claiming that the plant subject can, through its 
representations, only act on its organism, not on other representations? Might 
Kant hold its powers of representation are only capable of working through its 
representations on its organism, but not capable of working through its 
representations on other representations, except in a very limited way? If he did, 
then the way in which the plant is self-active would be quite restricted.59  
Suppose these questions were answered affirmatively. How would this plant 
subject coordinate its activities? Perhaps a solution can be found by returning to 
the “immeasurable manifoldness of partly volatile matters” that Kant holds plants 
produce from water (Sömmerring, 12:34). Perhaps otherwise isolated 
representations of the plant subject work on this water producing these volatile 
matters, these matters react physically with other matters, and those matters work 
on the soul, producing representations. If that were right, the plant subject would 
lack unity, apart from the physiological unity of its organism.60  
This need not commit Kant to multiple subjects simultaneously being 
connected to the same organism. The same subject would be the ground of all 
feelings of agreeableness and disagreeableness, as well as all corresponding desires 
that these give rise to, at any given moment. But there is no (even merely 
associative) temporal unity of the plant subject. Any apparent coordination of 
 
59 In examining our mind’s cognitive faculties, Kant explains its spontaneity as its “faculty for 
bringing forth representations itself” (A51/B75), and later clarifies that “among all representations 
combination is the only one that is not given through objects, but can be executed only by the 
subject itself, since it is an actus of its self-activity” (B130). If the speculations of the above 
paragraph are correct, then the plant’s cognitive faculty might be said to be entirely passive. After 
all, ex hypothesi, it at most combines representations in diffuse feeling/desire pairs. On their own 
these feelings or desires do not seem to involve combination within themselves, as both intuition 
and concepts seem to. Because this is the only means by which its faculty for representing might be 
said to act on itself, and arguably the engendering of a desire through a feeling does not genuinely 
combine these representations because it does not engender a new representation, the plant subject 
might be said to be incapable of self-activity, or entirely passive. Still, it can both be effected by the 
plant’s bodily states and effect these states, and so is a subject capable of representations. And even 
if this subject is entirely passive, that does not conflict with the subject and organism, together, 
exhibiting another kind of self-activity, insofar as the former acts on the latter. 
60 I owe the thought that the physiological unity of the organism could help here to a suggestion 
from Alexandra Newton. 
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representations in the course of the plant’s life would be attributed to its unity of 
subject. This temporal disunity, however, would not commit Kant to a 
corresponding spatial one. As an organism, the quince unifies its spatial parts into 
a whole and the quince subject is the subject posited as the ground of the 
coordination of motion of its parts.  
The lack of any kind of inner sense for the plant subject, however, would 
not merely mean they could not connect representations undergone at different 
times, extensively, but also that the intensity of their representations at a single 
moment is of a fundamentally different sort than we find in animals. Consider the 
following objection to our account. Kant describes sensations as representations 
with consciousness (A320/B376), and claims, “now every sensation has a degree or 
magnitude, through which it can more or less fill the same time, i.e., inner sense in 
regard to the same representation of an object” (A143/B182). We already saw that 
plants don’t have empirical consciousness, don’t have inner sense, and don’t 
generally have objective sensations. Nonetheless, one might take these passages to 
further imply that for Kant feelings, too, have an intensity, that this intensity 
depends on empirical consciousness (A167/B208), and that even if one can have 
unconscious feelings, this depends on the degree of consciousness of these feelings 
being below a certain threshold. Because, however, even unconscious feelings 
must have an intensity of some degree, only creatures capable of consciousness 
can have them, and so plants can’t feel. 61 
While perhaps one could respond by arguing plant feelings always have 
only a low degree of consciousness, the more plausible route is to concede plant 
feelings are non-conscious. This seems to be how they are qualitatively different 
than the feelings found in non-rational animals. Still, in discussing Mendelssohn, 
Kant claims all powers of the soul, not just consciousness, have an intensity (B414; 
also MAN, 4:542-543). He argues for this from the elanguescence of 
consciousness—its possible diminution to zero. This might be taken to imply that 
 
61
 It was by reflecting on a question from Béatrice Longuenesse that I was lead to consider this 
objection and the Mendelssohn passage in this connection. I hope that I’ve stayed true to the spirit 
of what she was asking. 
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all psychological powers are grounded in consciousness. Nonetheless, I do not 
think we need to take this final step. Consciousness can illuminate this feature of 
psychological powers without it grounding them. Kant holds consciousness is our 
best means for cognizing the degree of reality of the soul, but this does not entail 
that all psychological powers of the soul must be conscious powers.  
Still, if all faculties of the soul, even non-conscious ones, have an intensity, 
how do we make sense of the intensity of non-conscious plant powers? Because 
our representations have a conscious component, we will struggle here. Perhaps, 
however, the physical movement of the plant can help. Although the psychological 
faculties of the supersensible soul are Kant’s focus in the Mendelssohn passage, 
when he claims that all powers of the soul have an intensity, he does not seem to 
only have these in mind. The formative power of the younger quince might, for 
example, exhibit more vitality than the older quince, because it grows faster, heals 
quicker, and produces more quinces. This more ardent activity of the younger 
quince, in turn, would be indicative of more intense desires, and correspondingly 
more intense feelings of agreeableness and disagreeableness grounding these. If 
plants have faculties of desire and feeling, then the intensity (or intensive 
magnitude) of these (along with their acts) would not seem to be a matter of the 
intensity of consciousness, but there seems to be nothing further to be said about 
the potential intensity of plant powers and acts, beyond that the only grasp we 
have on this intensity is through the motions that they produce.  
At this point, however, if the extensive coordination of representations 
across time only happens by way of their physical organism, and if even the 
intensity of their psychological states can only be inferred on the basis of their self-
movement but is not a matter of the degree of consciousness in them, why hold 
plants have representations or a subject at all? Why not hold that the physical—
mechanical and chemical—actions and reactions of their parts are sufficient 
grounds for their self-movement? Why aren’t representations vestigial?  
We can sink deeper into this quandary if we consider that in the Opus 
Postumum Kant seems to indicate plants do not have a (2) subject, precisely 
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because they do not exhibit the requisite unity: “The physical organized body is 
animated mater that is either (vegetatively or animally) animated; that is, either 
only through the combination of many substances together, or through an 
absolute unity—ensouled” (OP, 22:399). This finds further support in the Critique 
of Judgment when, commenting on the healing power of plants, Kant points out 
that  
[A]n eye from the leaf of one tree grafted into the twig of another brings forth a 
growth of its own kind in an alien stock, and similarly a scion attached to another 
trunk. Hence one can regard every twig or leaf of one tree as merely grafted or 
inoculated into it, hence as a tree existing in itself, which only depends on the 
other and nourishes itself parasitically (KU, 5:371; also OP, 22:418).  
This all suggests that Kant held animals coordinate the activities of their organism 
via their (2) soul as subject, but plants do not, because their unity only stems from 
their shared body, their organism, and they are otherwise only a combination of 
many substances, nourishing themselves parasitically on one another. 
Yet, this cannot really be indicative of Kant’s considered view. After all, the 
leaves of the quince are not parasites. The leaves, branches, trunk, and roots form 
one tree, one organism. And part of what this means is that the quince coordinates 
the life activities of its parts in the operation of its formative power. Furthermore, 
if a part of a plant, or hydra, or whatever is severed from the main organism and 
yet stays alive, this is because a principle of life is found in it that can now take up 
this coordinating role, and thereby seems to exhibit the unity of a subject (R1530, 
15:957). 
This coordination of its activities and parts are also why representations are 
not vestigial. Kant is concerned, remember, not to commit himself to hylozoism: 
he does not want to imbue extended matter of any sort with a property or power 
that can only belong to what is not extended. That is why nerves are at most 
material conditions for the mind, and the mind is not located in space. Any being 
with an internally active power is alive. Through its formative power the plant 
determines itself to motion or rest, as change of its state, and so has such an 
internally active power. Matter as matter is dead. An internally active power is 
called life, and for this power one must look outside matter to an alien principle 
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standing in communion with it. This principle is not only a supersensible soul, but 
also a subject that has powers of representation. Thus, for Kant, although in the 
plant the chemical decomposition of water is the material condition of its 
subjecthood, the subject has to be there even if it is disconnected and diffuse. 
This is why Kant would reflectively attribute a soul and unconscious desire 
to plants, despite the disanalogy between the beaver and the quince. After all, the 
quince does exhibit unity: it orders its parts as though it were made in accord with 
its species-form. And although the order in the quince does not warrant 
attributing to it the kind of desire we find in the beaver, because we find the 
quince striving to order its parts in a unified way, we should ascribe non-conscious 
desires to it. After all, such unified striving is something we find in our own case, 
which seems indicative of life, and which seems to thereby provide a generic 
concept common to all animate beings that is more determinate than “thing in 
general” (KU, 5:464n).  
Further, it is because all self-organizing matter must involve such an 
immaterial principle that Kant lauds Blumenbach for declaring 
it to be contrary to reason that raw matter should originally have formed itself in 
accordance with mechanical laws, that life should have arisen from the nature of 
the lifeless, and that matter should have been able to assemble itself into the form 
of a self-preserving purposiveness by itself. (5:424) 
Mere dead matter cannot be the cause of something self-moving, self-active, or 
immaterial. Rather, Kant holds that if we seek the ground of this kind of self-
activity, exhibited by the formative power of organisms, we must seek it outside of 
nature. And for this reason while the reflective judgments of natural teleology rely 
on the reflective attribution of a formative power to the organism, these judgments 
themselves point outside nature, towards (2) a soul as subject and (3) as a 
supersensible ground of self-activity. 
 
§10 – The absence of souls in Kant’s teleology  
If the above considerations are correct, then it can seem striking and 
strange that Kant does not discuss the desires of plants or their souls in his 
teleology. After all, if we can reflectively ascribe desire to plants, then that would 
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seem to be useful for investigating their inner motion. And if we can reflectively 
ascribe supersensible souls as the ground of this motion, then why doesn’t he 
discuss this? Why does he instead turn to God or nature in general as the medium 
of God’s creation?  
A quick initial answer might be that in natural teleology, neither (2) the 
psychological subject, nor (3) the supersensible soul are part of its topic. 
Nonetheless, God is supernatural and does have a role at least through reflecting 
judgment. So why don’t supernatural souls figure in a similar way? 
The answer lies in Kant’s account of organisms as natural ends. Note that it 
isn’t just plant souls and desires that are conspicuously absent from the 
explanations of goal directed activity or the supersensible grounds of organized 
matter in the discussion of the Critique of Teleology. Non-rational animal desires 
and souls also barely make an appearance, and arguably plants make more of one 
because Kant’s primary example is of a tree. This is because of the phenomena 
Kant is interested in accounting for and the nature of the teleology in question. 
We’ve seen that we can reflectively attribute desires to both the beaver and the 
quince through an analogy with our own case. This can perhaps ground a kind of 
reflective psychological teleology of them, that accounts for their acts through 
their desires. But psychology is not Kant’s topic. Rather, he wants to investigate 
how there could be such organisms in the first place.  
Digging into this, the beaver and the quince, but not the tin, seem to be 
natural ends. We form a concept (end, as concept) against which we measure what 
sort of thing (end, as object) they are supposed to be (KU, 5:227, 5:180, 5:220). In 
the case of organisms, considered as natural ends, the concept in question is of the 
species-form. It is as if they were created according to this. Thus, we treat this 
species-form not only as providing the normative standard for the order and 
behavior of the organism and its parts, but also as if it was the cause of the 
individual. That is, we treat this species-form as if it were the cause of the tree and 
its leaves through the intention of a being who wanted them to accord with the 
order dictated by this form.  
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On the account given we can think of the soul, reflectively, as an immaterial 
artificer of the organism that works to enact its desires, ordering its parts 
according to its species-form. Even still, the intention to cause or create an 
organism that orders its parts according to its species-form could not belong to the 
soul of the quince, the beaver, or even us, at least in the relevant sense.  
We can see why this would be in each kind of case. The quince has the 
desire to order its parts according to its species-form. But the quince lacks a 
faculty of choice and so its inner motion is not voluntary. It finds itself in an 
environment, and strives to grow, heal, and reproduce. The environment is either 
conducive to this, or not, in various ways. And this is evident, say, in the direction 
the leaves grow. But because plants do not choose, they do not intend. 
The beaver or the dog can choose. The dog smells the roast and the loaf, 
compares these sensations, and goes for the loaf (FS, 2:60). The dog anticipates the 
more intense pleasure of tasting the roast. The desire grounded on this overpowers 
the desire for the loaf. And in this way, the dog chooses the loaf. Still, the dog does 
not choose the loaf freely—it is a spiritual automaton—but it is only freely chosen 
ends that will be intentions. 
We, however, do freely choose. We author our own actions and ends. And, 
thus, we intend. Insofar as we set our ends, not nature, Newton is right that there 
is  a sense, perhaps, that it is up to us to constitute our own life-form through 
reason (2017, p. 525).  Still, we are born with a body, an organism, and have certain 
needs—certain subjectively necessary ends—in relation to it. We can further 
determine these needs by, say, cultivating our tastes. We can freely choose to do 
this. And we can even choose to forsake these needs for some higher good.  
Nonetheless, these needs, like the need to eat, are given by our species-form. We 
find ourselves with them, and as natural ends they are not something we can freely 
choose. We might through breeding, say, work to modify the needs of a species—
even our own. But it is beyond our power to directly choose the ends given us by 
our bodies, and to create natural ends ex-nihilo.  
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In all three cases, then, if organisms were created through an intention that 
they order their parts, according to Kant, this intention belonged to God. This is 
the reason Kant does not focus on the souls of organisms as the supersensible 
grounds of organized beings in the Critique of Teleology. Appeals to souls could 
not account for how it could be as if organisms were created through an 
intention—as if they were natural ends. Only God’s intentions (through the 
medium of nature) could do this.  
 
§11 – Conclusion 
At the end of §3, Kant was faced with a paradox: matter, as matter, is inert. 
Yet, organisms are material beings that seem to move, not merely in accord with 
mechanical and chemical laws, but themselves, as though they are natural ends. 
Considered as natural ends, they were both cause and effect of themselves, like a 
self-maintaining watch or ship. In this respect the parts of the organism are 
instruments (Werkzeuge) of one another and the whole (KU, 5:374), just as the 
nerves are instruments (Werkzeuge) of the body and soul (Met-M, 29:908). We’ve 
seen how the analogy extends to all organisms, even plants, except that in them 
nerves are replaced by the “partly volatile matters” produced from water 
(Sömmerring, 12:34). I have argued that inner self-movement, a supersensible 
principle of life, and a psychological subject come as a package. In the Second 
Paralogism we saw Kant’s hypothesis as to why: the same supersensible ground 
that is the physical body in one relation may be the psychological subject in the 
other (A359). Still, recognizing that organisms interact with a soul that represents 
and is a supersensible ground of their activity does not tell us more about the 
intention with which they may have been created. Nonetheless, just as we can fill 
out our explanation of the dog’s going for the roast through anticipation of the 
pleasure of its taste, we can fill out our explanation of how the quince orders its 
parts through a simple kind of desire. Because this cause is psychological, it will 
not figure in an explanation of its physical formative power, and for this reason it 
will not yield cognition. Nonetheless, this attribution can help guide our natural, 
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physical investigations. And while these desires cannot be counted among the 
mechanical causes of motion, they can help account for the difference between 
plants and tin, or life and phlogiston. For these reasons, through examining Kant’s 
remarks on plant life, we have seen that living beings move themselves, have a 
supersensible ground of their activity, and desire, and that the concept of life is a 
common genus shared by plants, non-rational animals, and human beings. 62 
Throughout, however, I expect that the reader will have noticed various 
places that someone who interprets Kant as denying representations and life to 
plants might resist. As I mentioned in note 3 above, I think there is room for 
informed disagreement on this point, and there is a reason for this tension in 
Kant’s view. On the one hand, the traditional view since Aristotle has been that 
plants are alive and have souls, but do not represent. Kant, however, endorses a 
modern conception of physical motion, in which the principle of inertia is central. 
This makes the kind of inner motion we find in organisms mysterious. The obvious 
solution is to posit that organisms have minds and corresponding desires, through 
 
62 This is nominally, pace Conant’s claim that there is no “highest common factor” of the cognitive 
capacities of all living beings (2016, p. 78). It is not clear, however, that this apparent disagreement 
is deep. We’ve seen that Kant thinks we share with non-rational animals (and plants) a common 
genus, “living being” (KU, 5:464n), and I’ve argued that all living beings are self-active and desire. 
Still, we’ve also seen that there is a transformation in kind—a qualitative transformation—between 
the powers of rational and non-rational animals, and between non-rational animals and plants. I’ve 
agreed with Engstrom that desiring always shares a common form: it is striving, and that is a 
matter of its form—the way it is efficacious representation. In this respect it might seem that I 
disagree with Conant’s claim that there is a formal difference between our cognitive powers and the 
cognitive powers of a bird, like the formal difference he finds between the limbs of a bird and our 
limbs (2016, p. 80).  
This appearance, however, is deceptive. Saying that desires, in each case, share a common 
form does not entail that they share the same form in all respects. In fact, given the qualitative 
difference between the representing subject in us (as finite and self-conscious), non-rational 
animals (as merely conscious), and plants (as not conscious), the nature of desires, and in this 
sense their form, will be quite different in each case. After all, drawing an analogy between our (a) 
self-conscious subject, with its (b) self-conscious desires, and (c) non-conscious plant subject, with 
its (d) non-conscious desires, depends on (b) and (d) being different terms. If there were no 
transformation in this difference, then it wouldn’t be an inference by analogy. In this respect, I am 
sympathetic with Conant’s polarizing thesis. Nonetheless, I am neither comfortable declaring my 
allegiance nor my opposition, because it is not clear enough what he means when he claims there is 
a “formal” difference between, e.g., the desires of non-rational and rational animals. It is thus not so 
clear where this leaves us with respect to whether Kant has a transformative or additive (layer-
cake) view of mindedness which, at least in some circles, seems to have supplanted conceptualism 
and non-conceptualism as the main theater of contention in interpreting Kant’s conception of 
mindedness. 
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which they move their bodies. But then what of plants? One is now torn between 
the view that their self-motion can be accounted for in the same way as one 
accounts for the self-motion of other organisms, on the one hand, and the 
traditional view that they do not have minds and do not desire, on the other. In 
this respect, with plants, two sides of Kant’s thought come into tension, even if the 
most promising resolution is to interpret Kant as holding plants represent non-
consciously.63  
 
Note on Kant’s texts and abbreviations 
When available, I have usually stuck to the Cambridge edition translations 
of Kant’s works, although some translations are my own. I have used either the 
Kantian Review or the Kant-Studien abbreviations of Kant’s works. Because there is 
no work on pure general logic authored and published by Kant, I have generally 




63  Although I began to get sucked in to thinking about plant representations while puzzling over 
consciousness and the various hierarchies of cognition that Kant presents across his logic lectures 
(e.g., 9:65), it was finding the passage where Kant attributes a faculty of desire to plants at Log-D, 
24:772 that got me searching out the relevant discussions. Around this time, in 2012, I had an 
exchange with Andrew Chignell in which he encouraged me to develop my findings in to a paper. I 
didn’t return to the topic, however, until I decided to prepare a short essay for the 13th 
International Kant Congress held in Oslo, in August of 2019. In the process of preparing that essay, 
as well as the corresponding presentation, I received helpful feedback on the essay from Tom 
Marré, Kosta Gligorijevic, and Robbie Howton. I would like to thank the audience in Oslo for their 
insightful questions, comments, and discussion, both during the session and after (especially 
Janum Sethi). I then spent the fall completely revising, restructuring, and lengthening the essay. 
During this process Colin McLear gave me two rounds of extensive comments that were invaluable 
in pushing me to develop the essay further. In June of 2020 I presented the essay to the biennial 
meeting of the North American Kant Society, where Alexandra Newton gave a truly excellent set of 
comments in reply. It was in thinking over these comments, as well as the superb questions that I 
received on that occasion (especially from Clinton Tolley and Béatrice Longuenesse), that §8 & 9 
blossomed into their current form. In this, its final stage of development, I also received feedback 
from a number of other colleagues and friends that were quite helpful in shaping the essay. These 
included comments from Houston Smit, Kathryn Lindeman, Matthew Kisner, Kim Frost, Thomas 
Land and Chris Frey. I’d like to thank an anonymous referee at this journal both for their insightful 
suggestions, and their enthusiastic response to the essay. And finally, I’d like to thank Maya 
Kronfeld and Anthony (A.G.) Holdier who will comment on the essay in a symposium session for 
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